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* In Rhode Island, a troubled man, whom police are trying to
dissuade from committing suicide, receives an unsolicited call from a
reporter and shoots himself to death moments after a television station
airs his taped goodbyes.
e In Michigan, a young man who appears on The Jenny Jones
Show to reveal that he had a secret crush on another man is shot to
death by the shocked object of his affection.
* In Louisiana, a woman working at a convenience store is shot
and left paralyzed from the neck down by a young couple on a crime
spree after the couple repeatedly watched Oliver Stone's movie,
Natural Born Killers.
* In suburban Washington, D.C., two women and a disabled boy
are murdered by an assassin who fastidiously followed guidelines in
Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors.
e In Texas, a federal agent is shot while storming a religious cult's
armed fortress-the result, he claims, of the press letting the cult know
of the planned raid.
* In Georgia, a man backing his car down his driveway is shot by
assassins hired as the result of an ad in Soldier of Fortune, a magazine
for self-styled mercenaries.
* In Missouri, a woman escapes from an abductor wielding a
sawed-off shotgun, then is stalked by the man after a newspaper prints
her name and address.
Are the media responsible for the harm? Some might ask, are the
media responsible, period?'
"A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution, and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated."2 So spoke the United States
1. William A. Henry comments, "News consumers may ... wonder if journalism has any
rules at all. The honest answer: not really." William A. Henry Ill, When Reporters Break the
Rules, TIME, Mar. 15, 1993, at 75. Strictly speaking, Henry is wrong. Journalists do have rules. The
problem is that too often those rules are imposed from the outside by courts instead of journalists
imposing the rules upon themselves. The examples are many. The rule that journalists shall not
damage another's reputation through falsehoods has been imposed upon journalists through libel
law. Justice Stewart stated eloquently the justification for libel law: "The right of a man [or
woman] to the protection of his [or her] own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful
hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92 (1966). In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), the Court ruled that
journalists who breach their promises of confidentiality could face liability under contract law.
See infra note 15 for discussion at a "Talk Summit" on media responsibility.
2. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241,256 (1974).
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Supreme Court in 1974. Perhaps press responsibility cannot be
legislated, but more and more courts, with the Supreme Court's
approval, are making the media pay when the media expose others to
the risk of bodily harm. If blood flows, or if an individual is merely put
in jeopardy, courts are extracting payment from the media: blood
money. Fancy First Amendment theory falls by the way. Talk of the
importance of a free press proves wasted breath. In short, media
protection crumbles while protection of the individual prevails.
Awarding blood money in such cases has rational and emotional
appeal, at least to the public. Surely it seems plausible that, in
balancing the rights of freedom of speech and press against the right to
life, courts should pronounce that the right to life is more important.
Courts are implicitly saying that stilling the press is preferable to
stilling a heart.
But, as is often the case, awarding damages is a slippery slope.
Perhaps where the media's actions have clearly exposed a particular
person (the victim) to the risk of bodily harm or death by another
particular person (the assailant), the media should pay. But what if
there were no readily identifiable victim or assailant? How nebulous-
or how remote-can the risk be and still subject the media to liability?
This article explores the developing area of the law of negligence
as applied to media when an evil-doer, unassociated with the media,
takes advantage of information revealed by the media to threaten or
wreak bodily harm or death. After defining "negligence," this article
explores current negligence suits bombarding mass media. The article
will examine suits against TV broadcast companies, a movie producer,
a book publisher, and a newspaper. The likelihood of success of these
suits can only be measured by analyzing prior negligence cases, most
notably Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.3 and Hyde v. City
of Columbia.4 The media lost both of these cases, and the United
States Supreme Court declined certiorari.
This article next explores the related doctrine of strict liability,
concluding that this doctrine has not proved fruitful for plaintiffs suing
the media. With the exception of cases involving aeronautical charts,
the courts have refused to treat information as a product to which
strict liability can apply.
The question of endorsement of a product, as explored further in
this article, is a significant issue in cases concerning media liability.
3. 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071 (1993).
4. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
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The absence of an endorsement means no liability, no duty to check
for accuracy, and no duty to warn. In short, a type of caveat emptor
seems to prevail. However, an endorsement can result in media
liability.
This article next discusses the doctrine of incitement. But like
strict liability, incitement has not proved productive for plaintiffs. A
current suit involving "gangsta rap" by Tupac Shakur, however, leaves
the window open for a successful suit in this area.
5
This article concludes with a discussion of the increased danger in
the United States from bombings, some arguably triggered by the
availability of bomb recipes on the Internet. This article asks whether
increasing dangers to physical safety are endangering freedom of
expression. The concern is that if the perceived dangers become too
"clear and present," some freedom of speech and press might be
sacrificed on the altar of safety. Could "how to" books on mayhem be
sacrificed while serious literary works that inspire some demented
readers to murder be spared? The answer is muddy.
Nevertheless, this fact is clear: media that ignore a foreseeable
risk of physical harm to others risk liability because courts are
extracting money from them for the blood spilled. The bottom line is
that negligence suits are an increasing risk to the financial health of
the media.
I
Current Suits for Negligence
A. Negligence: An Old Tort Theory
Standard negligence law provides the legal backdrop for assessing
press liability in bodily injury cases such as that originating in Waco,
Texas. The key to liability in negligence cases is "foreseeability." If an
individual engages in conduct that could foreseeably create harm, and
if that harm then occurs, the individual may be liable for negligence.
The Supreme Court has dealt with negligence cases virtually since
the Court's inception. In 1786, it heard a maritime case involving
"gross negligence (craffa negligentia).6 Early Supreme Court tort law
discussed liability for negligence if an injury was a probable
consequence of the defendant's act:
5. See infra Part V.F.2 for a full discussion of "gansta rap."
6. Purviance v. Angus, 1 U.S. 180, 182 (1786).
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[I]t is generally held that, in order to warrant a finding that
negligence ... is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear
that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence or wrongful act, and that it ousht to have been foreseen
in the light of the attending circumstances.
The Court explained in another early case:
[A] careless person is liable for all the natural and probable
consequences of his [or her] misconduct. If the misconduct is of a
character which, according to the usual experience of mankind, is
calculated to invite or induce the intervention of some subsequent
cause, the intervening cause will not excuse him [or her], and the
subsequent mischief will be held to be the result of the original
misconduct. This is upon the ground that one is held responsible for
all the consequences of his act which are natural and probable, and
ought to have been foreseen by a reasonably prudent man [or
woman] 8
More recent Supreme Court cases reveal a refinement in
negligence theory. No longer must the injury be the result of the
defendant's act. The defendant could be held liable for the
"intentional or criminal misconduct" of another, so long as that
misconduct should have been foreseen: "That the foreseeable danger
was from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant; respondent
nonetheless had a duty to make reasonable provision against it.
Breach of that duty would be negligence ...."I
Where voluntary acts of responsible human beings intervene
between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury, the problem of
foreseeability is the same and courts generally are guided by the
same test. If the likelihood of the intervening act was one of the
hazards that made defendant's conduct negligent-that is, if it was
sufficiently foreseeable to have this effect-then defendant will
generally be liable for the consequences .. . . So far as scope of
duty ...is concerned, it should make no difference whether the
intervening actor is negligent or intentional or criminal.10
"Foreseeability" has consistently referred to what a "reasonably
prudent person" would "reasonably" foresee under similar
circumstances." Another unchanging element of negligence theory is
that "ordinary care" is the standard one must meet in order to avoid
7. Scheffer v. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249, 252 (1881)(quoting Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v.
Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469,475 (1876)).
8. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U.S. 1, 7 (1909).
9. Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 462 (1947)(footnote omitted).
10. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 405-06 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW
OF TORTS § 20.5 (1956)(footnotes omitted in original)).
11. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 118 (1963).
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liability: "[I]t is said that negligence is the failure to observe ordinary
care, and ordinary care is that degree of care which people of ordinary
prudence and sagacity use under the same or similar circumstances.
What would ordinarily prudent persons have done under like
circumstances?"' 2
The two immutable concepts in negligence theory-(1) that
negligence law involves what a "reasonably prudent person" would
foresee and (2) that it holds persons to a standard of "ordinary care"-
are woven together in this passage:
It is always a question of what reasonably prudent persons under
like or similar circumstances would or should have anticipated in the
exercise of ordinary care. Where there is no danger reasonably to be
anticipated or apprehended, there is no duty to guard against
something that in the minds of reasonable men [or women] does not
exist. However, if such expectation carries a realization that a given
set of circumstances is suggestive of danger, then failure to take
appropriate safety measures constitutes negligence.13
In short, the law of negligence operates on the theory that we are,
at least to some extent, each others' keepers. While we do not have to
be extraordinary in what we foresee or in the care we take, we must
rise to the level of common or ordinary circumspection. Requiring at
least this standard presumably works to the advantage of society as a
whole.
B. Surviving Family Members and an Injured Federal Agent Take Aim at
the Media
Questions about media responsibility seem to be arising with
increasing frequency. In 1996, at least a half-dozen cases were winding
their slow courses through the legal system, seeking damages from
producers of a TV talk show, a TV news station, makers of a movie, a
book publisher, a newspaper, a TV-news crew, and a record company.
The record company case, resulting from the shooting death of a
Texas trooper by a teenager listening to Tupac Shakur's "gangsta
rap," will be covered later in the "incitement" discussion. 4 Regardless
of whether any of the cases provide relief for the plaintiffs, one point is
clear: the risk of media having to stand trial for negligence or related
charges is certainly increasing.
12. Id. at n.6 (quoting instructions to the jury).
13. Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 138, 146 n.2 (1959)(quoting jury
instructions).





In March 1995, Jonathan Schmitz, a 24-year-old from Michigan,
appeared as a guest on The Jenny Jones Show to meet a person who
had a secret crush on him. Schmitz assumed the secret admirer would
be a woman. Instead, it was Scott Amedure, a 32-year-old gay man.
Three days later, Schmitz bought a 12-gauge shotgun and killed
Amedure. Then he called the police. 15 The show's producers did not
broadcast the tape of the encounter between Schmitz and Amedure.16
On November 12, a jury convicted Schmitz of second-degree
murder, 7 finding he acted without premeditation.' On December 4,
the trial judge sentenced Schmitz to a prison term of 25 to 50 years
instead of for life as the prosecutor had asked; the judge said he took
into consideration Schmitz's thyroid condition, alcoholism, and history
15. Ann Leslie, In the TV Ratings War, Weirdos Are Winners, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 31, 1995, at
20; Alexandra Marks, Talk Television Goes on Trial, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 11, 1995, at
12. See also Dick Feagler, Some TV Talk Shows Can Be Deadly Serious, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Mar. 15, 1995, at 2A.
Media responsibility became a hot topic during the last weekend of October 1995, when
Population Communications International sponsored a "Talk Summit" at Manhattan's
Millennium Hotel. TV talk-show producers heard an earful, including criticism by Health and
Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala. See Verne Gay, Off Camera: TV Talk Is Cheap: After
the Summit, Responsible Talk Shows? Nonsense, NEWSDAY, Oct. 31, 1995, at B2; Verne Gay, Off
Camera: Searching in the Trash: A 'Summit' of the Talk Shows," NEWSDAY, Oct. 26, 1995, at B3.
Former Education Secretary William Bennett and two senators, Joseph I. Lieberman and
Sam Nunn, showed clips of, and urged Americans to boycott, daytime talk shows. Lieberman
called it "the revolt of the revolted." See Cheryl Wetzstein & Joyce Price, Bennett Declares War
on Daytime Talk Shows: Two Senators Join in Bid to Restore 'Decency,' WASH. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1995, at A4. The Talk Summit, some commentators say, resulted because of the murder of
Amedure following the taping of The Jenny Jones Show. See David Hiltbrand, Picks & Pans,
PEOPLE, Nov. 13, 1995, at 15.
16. The 'Jenny Jones' Trial Delayed, UPI, Oct. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File. A Michigan court of appeals struck down the circuit court judge's "overly
broad" gag order against the media in Schmitz's murder trial. Michigan v. Schmitz, No. 198196
(Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1996). Court TV covered the trial. Steve Brill, chief executive officer of
Court TV, promised, "If the episode is shown at the trial, then we will air it." Court TV to Air
'Jones' Outtake, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Oct. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, ENTRT Library,
THR File. Brill kept his word, airing the segment on October 17, 1996. David Bianculli, The
Devil in Ms. Jones' Program: Show at Center of Murder Trial Rabble-Rouses in Worst Degree,
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18, 1996, at 127. NBC's American Journal aired part of the tape on October 22,
1996, and NBC's Dateline aired part of it on October 25, 1996.
17. Vivian M. Baulch, The 'Jenny Jones' Case: Chronology of a Murder Case, DETROIT
NEWS, Nov. 13, 1996, at A6.
18. Jurors Back Leniency in TV Murder, CHI. TRIR, Nov. 13, 1996, at 10 [hereinafterJurors
Back Leniency].
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of depression that preceded the show's so-called "ambush." 19
Schmitz's lawyer blamed The Jenny Jones Show3° A juror interviewed
after the trial made clear that jurors felt the television show acted as a
"catalyst" for the murder.21
The dead man's family filed a $25-million wrongful-death suit
against Schmitz, the TV show, its owner, Telepictures Productions,
and its producer, Warner Brothers.' The plaintiffs allege that none of
19. Family Blames 'Jenny Jones Show' for Tripping Him: Man Who Killed Gay Admirer in
'Ambush TV' Case Gets 25-50 Years, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1996, at 8.
20. Marks, supra note 15, at 12. Schmitz's attorneys attempted to have the trial judge,
Francis O'Brien, removed. Another Attempt to Remove Judge in Jenny Jones Case, STATES NEWS
BRIEFS, Aug. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Schmitz's Murder Trial Set
for Oct. 7, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 11, 1996, at B3.
Interestingly, the district attorney originally prosecuting the Schmitz case also prosecuted
Dr. Jack Kevorkian for assisting suicides. His handling of both cases may have contributed to the
prosecutor's defeat for re-election in August 1996. He angered some members of the gay
community by refusing to call Amedure's murder a hate crime. Brian Harmon, Thompson Pins
Loss on Kevorkian Case, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 8, 1996, at Al.
Jury selection in the trial began on October 10, 1996, Ron French & Doug Durfee, Judge
Bars Families from Schmitz Trial, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 11, 1996, at D2. The trial itself began on
October 14, 1996. Ron French, Schmitz, Amedure Families Make Peace: Both Lost Sons in the
'Jenny Jones' Case, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 16, 1996, at C1; Ron French, 'Jenny Jones' Witness Lays
Out a Chilling Tale as Trial Begins, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 15, 1996, at Al; Todd Nissen, Talkshow
Murder Trial Opens in Michigan, REUTERS FIN. SER, Oct. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, REUTER File.
21. Sharing the Guilt; A Jenny Jones Guest Is Convicted of Murder, But Jurors Blame TV
Too, PEOPLE, Nov. 25, 1996, at 97; Michael Freeman, After Jenny, Tab TV Frets, MEDIAWEEK,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 9. See also Ron French, Schmitz Guilty, Jurors Blast TV: They Call 'Jenny Jones'
Show Catalyst for Slaying, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 13, 1996, at Al. Jones, the show's host, received
much criticism for her court testimony disclaiming any knowledge of how her show was run. See
Frazier Moore, Jones' Show Still Traveling the Low Road, CHI. TRw., Dec. 2, 1996, at 8
(criticizing Jones' "playing dumb"); Sharing the Guilt, PEOPLE, supra (quoting Jones as testifying,
"I don't produce the show, I don't book the show."); Marvin Kitman, The Marvin Kitman Show:
Jenny Jones Gets a Taste of Sauce for the Gander, NEWSDAY, Nov. 18, 1996, at B21 (calling Jones'
court appearance "[tihe best dramatic performance of the year" when "she recited those
immortal lines, 'I don't know.' 'I don't recall.' 'I have no idea."').
The show itself has also received criticism. See, e.g., Moore, supra; Editorial, Despicable
Tactics of 'Ambush TV' Should Cost its Originators Plenty, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale),
Nov. 17, 1996, at 6H; Caryn James, Critic's Notebook; From Talk to Murder, Via TV, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1996, at C18. One commentator remarked, "That everyone can be played with in public
without any risk to the players is a lethal assumption ...... Serious Fun: The Jenny Jones
Trial, VILLAGE VOIcE, Nov. 26, 1996, at 35.
Since Amedure's death, the show's ratings apparently have fallen. See Frederic M. Biddle,
The Silencing of Ambush-Style Talk Shows; Ratings Drop, Cancellations Follow 'Jenny Jones'
Furor, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15, 1996, at Dl (noting 24% drop in ratings in one year). See also
Michael Freeman, supra.
22. 'Jenny Jones' Lawsuit Will Stand, Judge Rules, CHI. TRw., Feb. 29, 1996, at 2; Talk
Show's Top Brass to Stand Trial, COM. APPEAL, Feb. 29, 1996, at 11A. See also Ron French,
'Jenny Jones' Case Changing the Tone of TV Talk Shows, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 1996, at 6A.
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the show's staff told Schmitz that the show would only deal with same-
sex crushes, but told Amedure to hug and kiss Schmitz and also gave
Amedure liquor to lower his inhibitions. In ruling against the defense
motion to dismiss the case, Judge Gene Schnelz of the Oakland
County Circuit Court in Pontiac, Michigan, asked the defense
attorney, "Aren't you kind of playing with fire?" When the attorney
answered that nothing indicated Schmitz was violence prone, the judge
said, "Nor did you check. Is that negligence?"'
The judge rejected the defense's argument that talk shows should
receive the same First Amendment protections of any news medium,
replying: "Excuse me, this isn't media. This is a television talk show."
The judge also rejected the argument that when guests left, the show's
responsibility ended. He compared the situation to that of a tavern
owner held responsible for the drunk-driving accident caused by a
customer served too many drinks?5
The activities of the persons involved in The Jenny Jones Show
may well have been tacky. The pivotal question, however, is whether
the activities of the show's personnel should lead to their legal liability
for the murder of Scott Amedure. Should persons involved with the
show have researched Jonathan Schmitz's background? If so, they
might have learned of his bouts of depression and his suicide
attempts26 But it is questionable how effectively they could have
researched this aspect of his background given the fact that medical
23. Michigan Judge Allows Lawsuit Over 'Jenny Jones' Killing, LIABILITY WEEK, Mar. 4,
1996, available in 1996 WL 9457747 [hereinafter Michigan Judge]. Apparently, such "ambushes"
are fairly common. See, e.g., Laura Myers, New Study Says Talk Show Hosts 'Ambush' Guests 16
Times an Hour, DErROIT NEWS, Nov. 17, 1995, at A6.
24. Michigan Judge, supra note 23; Ron French, Judge Ready to Give 'Jenny Jones' Trial
Prime-Time Slot, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 29, 1996, at D1.
25. Brian S. Akre, Judge Allows 'Jenny Jones' Slaying Suit to Go to Trial: Court Rejects
Argument of Threat to Free Speech in Action Against Show, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 29,
1996, at 37A. Charles G. Brown also used the tavern-liability language when talking about
liability for the publishers of Hit Man: A Technical Manualfor Independent Contractors:
[Civil suits against bartenders for serving intoxicated people have caused responsible
bars to stop serving such people; civil suits against convenience stores for serving
alcohol to minors have caused retailers to be more careful; civil suits against hotels for
freely giving out room numbers to those who then rape the occupants have caused
innkeepers to change this practice. Such defendants are not charged with being
criminals-but they have been required to pay money to the victims for their
negligence.
Charles G. Brown, Murder by the Book, and its Consequences, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 1996, at 13.
26. Jurors Back Leniency, supra note 18; James, supra note 21. Schmitz's psychiatrist
testified that Schmitz had told him about two suicide attempts. Ron French, In Pontiac:
Psychiatrist Discusses Schmitz's Mental Problems, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 23, 1996, at C3.
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records are closed. The show's personnel could ask all prospective
guests to produce their medical records as a precondition to appearing
on the show. Even so, problems remain: At what point does the risk
presented by the prospective guest become too dangerous? Should the
talk show have resident psychiatrists or psychologists to make this
judgment call?
For how long should a talk show be liable? No violence erupted
between Amedure and Schmitz on the show. In fact, Schmitz did not
even appear upset.27 Three days after the show, after an all-night
drinking binge, he gunned down Amedure. 8 Should talk shows be
required to monitor guests' subsequent activities, and if so, for how
long?
If talk shows have this responsibility, could news programs escape
similar liability? Although the judge in the pretrial hearing of The
Jenny Jones Show civil suit seemed to be making a distinction between
"media" and "talk shows," 29 other courts have refused to do so. As the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
has stated, "[t]he scope of what constitutes a newsworthy event has
been afforded a broad definition and held to include even matters of
'entertainment and amusement, concerning interesting phases of
human activity in general. . . . [I]t is not for the courts to decide
what matters are of interest to the general public."'
30
If a journalist interviews a person about an accusation, and then
the interviewee kills the accuser, should the journalist be held
responsible? What if a news show arranges a face-to-face
confrontation between the accused and the accuser? Should the
broadcaster be liable for a subsequent murder? What if the murder
occurs three days later? Are journalists responsible if, for example, an
admiral, faced with questioning by reporters about whether he should
be wearing a couple of combat "V" pins, commits suicide?
31
27. French, supra note 26.
28. Serious Fun, supra note 21.
29. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Mag., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citations
omitted). The United States Supreme Court also seems reluctant to make value judgments
where First Amendment protections are concerned. For instance, the Court has recognized the
"traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses
carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes
the latest photocomposition methods." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
31. In May 1996, Admiral Jeremy M. "Mike" Boorda committed suicide by shooting
himself in the heart after learning that two reporters would question him later that day about the
propriety of his wearing the bronze pins. See Bill McAllister & John Mintz, Boorda May Have
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Another way to pose the question is this: Is it reasonably
foreseeable that one human being will kill another who appeared on
the same talk show or news show, or that a person facing questions
will commit suicide? If one answers "yes," much investigative
reporting as well as talk shows could slide down the slippery slope.
The alternative is to recognize that confrontation is a daily part of life;
murder is not. To try to apply rules of foreseeability to irrational
behavior presents a conundrum of sorts: What would a reasonable,
rational person expect an unreasonable, irrational person to do?
Perhaps even harder is this question: When should a reasonable,
rational person expect another person to be unreasonable and
irrational? Should everyone have a duty to determine if the persons
with whom they are dealing are rational or not? Perhaps the safer
course would be for every individual to assume that everyone else is
irrational. But the world of rationality would surely break down under
this scheme of "everyone's crazy but you and me and I'm not sure
about you." Absurd things happen, but to hold a person responsible
for another person's absurdity is arguably the most absurd position of
all. It could easily make a mockery of First Amendment freedom of
expression and chill investigative reporting as well as talk shows.
b. News Show
In May 1993, a Rhode Island woman came home to find her
mentally ill husband, Bruce Clift, threatening suicide. He had turned
on a gas jet and then started firing guns. Police surrounded the home,
and the wife left. While an experienced police officer attempted to
dissuade Clift from killing himself, reporters gathered outside the
home. Then Clift received a phone call from a broadcast reporter who
had not asked police for permission to contact Clift. She taped an
interview with Clift and told him she would broadcast it. At 6:04 p.m.,
the reporter appeared on a newscast, live from the scene. She told
viewers:
It's obvious we're dealing with a very troubled man.... I asked him
if he wanted us to broadcast a message for him. He agreed. What
you're about to hear is a man who is angry at the world and could be
on the verge of suicide. It's an interview you'll only see on Channel
12.32
Worn Right Medials: 1965 Manual Seems to Support Use of 'V' Pins, WASH. POST, May 18, 1996,
at Al. See also Jeff Stein, The 'V' That Time Forgot: In 1965, Mike Boorda and his Ship Went to
War. Here's the Untold Story of That Voyage, WASH. POST, July 21, 1996, at Cl.
32. Clift v. Narragansett Television, 688 A.2d 805, 806 (R.I. 1996).
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During the interview, the reporter asked Clift, "[W]hat would you
say to your wife. . . ?" He responded, "Only that I love her .... I
apologize 'cause I know it's my fault. . . ."33 She also asked him,
among other questions, "Are you scared?" and "Are you sick?" The
reporter concluded her interview by saying, "Mr. Clift told me he
would not surrender, and . . . he hung up the 'phone." At 6:07 p.m.,
Clift killed himself. Police rushed in and found his body. His
television sets were playing Channel 12.34
Clift's wife sued the television station, claiming her husband's
death was the result of the reporter's negligence. The trial judge
granted the defendant station's motion to dismiss, 5 but the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island reinstated the suit. Relying on a medical
doctor's affidavit, the court decided, "There were facts . . . that
suggest the decedent's suicide resulted from an uncontrollable impulse
that was brought about by a delirium or insanity caused by
Narragansett's negligence." 36 The trial judge mistakenly tried to
determine the affidavit's truth, the appeals court said, instead of
leaving that determination to a jury. The issues of fact the affidavit
raised, the court said, are whether the reporter's call "exacerbated"
Clift's pre-existing "self-destructive impulses" and the likelihood he
would have killed himself when he did if the reporter had not called.'
2. Movies
Oliver Stone's 1994 movie, Natural Born Killers,' tells the tale of
two young lovers who murder their parents and then continue on a
violent crime spree. The movie has been blamed for a dozen or so
"copy cat" murders in the United States and Europe.' On March 8,
33. Id. at 806.
34. Id. at 807.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 805.
37. Id.
38. NATURAL BORN KILLERS (Warner Bros. 1994).
39. For instance, a Georgia teenager allegedly killed an elderly man and then proclaimed
on TV, "I'm a natural born killer"; a 14-year-old Texas boy allegedly watched the movie and
then decapitated a 13-year-old girl; and a Utah teenager put on glasses and shaved his head to
look like one of the characters in Natural Born Killers, then allegedly killed his sister and
stepmother. Dante Ramos, Screening Violence, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Aug. 6, 1996, at
Al. See also Adam Sandier, Grisham vs. Stone: 'Killer' Opponents, VARIETY, June 17, 1996, at 11.
All of the incidents are covered in Michael Shnayerson, Natural Born Opponents, VANITY FAIR,
July 1996, at 100.
Among other movies allegedly inspiring copy-cat deaths are: THE MONEY TRAIN (Columbia
1995); CHILD'S PLAY 3 (United Artists 1993); and THE DEER HUNTER (EMI Universal 1981).
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1995, Patricia Byers, a 37-year-old convenience store clerk in
Ponchatoula, Louisiana, was paralyzed by a bullet to her neck. A
videotape recorded the shooting by a young Oklahoma couple who
allegedly watched Stone's movie over and over and ingested LSD
before starting a crime spree that included killing a Mississippi man.'
Byers filed a $20 million negligence suit against Stone and Warner
Brothers, among others, 41 for their "distributing a film which they
knew or should have known would cause and inspire people to commit
crimes; and for producing and distributing a film which glorified the
type of violence committed."'42
The Mississippi victim, gunned down at his cotton gin, was
William Savage, a friend of John Grisham, the lawyer who authored
The Firm.43 Grisham, reflecting on death and the movie, urged a
products liability theory for recovery. Writing in The Oxford
American, he said:
Think of a film as a product. Something created and brought to
market, not too dissimilar from breast implants. Though the law has
yet to declare movies to be products, it is only one small step away.
If something goes wrong with the product, whether by design
or defect, and injury ensues, then its makers are held
responsible .... 44
Jonathan Freedland, Is Oliver Stone Responsible for the Consequences of this Film? GUARDIAN
(London), June 19, 1996, at T012.
The film Boulevard Nights led to a murder, the plaintiffs argued in an unsuccessful suit in
1982. See infra notes 225-228 and accompanying text.
40. Elizabeth Gleick,A Time to Sue: John Grisham Wants Oliver Stone to Pay for Movie-
Inspired Mayhem, TIME, June 17, 1996, at 90; Manny Gamallo, Effects of Film Argued: Famous
Names Enter Edmondson Case, TULSA WORLD, June 13, 1996, at Al. See also Dante Ramos,
supra note 39.
41. Grisham Firmly Backs $20M Suit vs. Oliver Stone, BOSTON HERALD, July 10, 1996, at 17;
Manny Gamallo, supra note 40. See also Tony Gallagher, Stone's L20m Lawsuit Over Copycat:
Woman Paralysed in Robbery Sues Director of Natural Born Killers, DAILY MAIL (London), June
13, 1996, at 29.
The young woman who allegedly shot Patsy Byers is Sarah Edmondson, the daughter of an
Oklahoma district judge, the niece of the Oklahoma attorney general, the granddaughter of a
congressman, and the great niece of a governor who was also a congressman. Shnayerson, supra
note 39, at 100. Patsy Byers' attorney, Joe Simpson, thought that the resources of Edmondson's
family alone were sufficient to warrant a suit, but then he found out about the Oliver Stone
connection through criminal court proceedings arising from the crime spree. Under a fluke in the
Louisiana negligence law in effect at the time of the shooting, Stone could be liable for up to 50
percent of any damage awards Byers might win. Id. at 105.
42. Sandier, supra note 39.
43. Gleick, supra note 40; Gamallo, supra note 40.
44. Shnayerson, supra note 39 (quoting John Grisham in OXFORD AMERICAN (Spring 1996)).
See also Sandier, supra note 39. For coverage of products liability theory and suits, see infra Part
III (strict liability) and Part IV (endorsements and sponsorships).
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This has sparked a war of words on First Amendment theory between
the celebrated author and the movie-maker, Stone.45
What Grisham fails to appreciate is that attempts such as his to
censor Stone will not only chill Stone's freedom of expression, but will
likewise plunge authors such as Grisham himself into an icy
netherworld where the risk of creative expression is too great to take.
Not only fictional works, but even news stories or historical accounts
could inspire some persons to murder. From shoot-'em-up Westerns to
retellings of war atrocities, from Shakespeare to the Bible, whether in
the form of words on printed pages, celluloid tape played in movie
theaters, or electronic broadcasts to homes, the uncertainties would be
the same: Could one safely express violent themes? The more
powerful the expression, the more inspirational or moving or real,
then arguably the more dangerous the expression becomes. Should
only bland accounts be tolerated? And how bland is bland enough to
suit Grisham? One can only wonder if he would be willing or able to
write under the conditions he wishes to impose on Stone.
3. Books
The seeds of a suit against a book publisher took root in 1993
when Lawrence Horn and James Perry entered a contract that Perry
would kill Horn's former wife, the Horns' eight-year-old quadriplegic
son, and the son's nurse. The intended victims lived in a Maryland
suburb outside Washington, D.C.46 Horn wanted to collect a $1.7
million trust fund his son had received in the settlement of a medical
malpractice suit.47 Perry planned how to complete his side of the
contract. He testified at his criminal trial that to kill the women he
followed the 27 steps outlined in a $10 book by "Rex Feral" entitled
Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors." Perry
used the recommended weapon and a homemade silencer, he shot
each woman through the eye three times, and he rubbed out the gun's
serial number. 49
45. For the feud between. Grisham and Stone, see Shnayerson, supra note 39, and infra
notes 408-415 and accompanying text.
46. Jan Crawford Greenburg, 'Hit Man' Lawsuit Targets Publisher, Ci. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1996,
at 1.
47. Karl Vick, Horn Convicted in Murders of Ex-Wife, Son and Nurse: Jury Finds He
Conspired with Hit Man, WASH. POST, May 4, 1996, at Al.
48. Kevin Simpson, Contract Murder: By the Man or by the Book? DENVER POST, Feb. 1,
1996, at B1.
49. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 940 F. Supp. 836,838-39 (S.D. Md. 1996).
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Perry followed additional instructional references from Hit Man
in planning and executing the murders, including how
to solicit for and obtain prospective clients in need of
murder for hire services; requesting up-front money for
expenses; ... [registering] at a motel in the vicinity of the crime,
paying with cash, and using a fake license tag number; committing
the murders at the victims' home; ... [making] the crime scene
look like a burglary; .. . [carrying] away the ejected shells;
breaking down the gun and discarding the pieces along the roadside
after the murders; and using a rental car, a stolen tag on the rental
car, and the discarding of the tag after the murders.
50
He simply smothered the disabled son to death with a pillow.51 A jury
convicted Perry and sentenced him to death.Y A jury convicted Horn
in May 1996 and sentenced him to life in prison.
53
Meanwhile, in late January 1996, surviving family members sued
the book publisher, Paladin Enterprises, Inc., seeking unspecified
damages. One attorney for the family, Rod Smolla, a professor at the
College of William and Mary Law School, said: "Our argument is that
there is currently no [First Amendment] protection for speech that
aids and abets an illegal transaction. ' ' -4
On July 22, 1996, Judge Alexander Williams, Jr., of the United
States District Court in Greenbelt, Maryland, heard arguments on the
defendants' summary judgment motion. The defendants' stipulated, in
part:
Defendants concede, for purposes of this motion, and for no other
purposes, that ...in publishing, marketing, advertising and
distributing Hit Man .. . .defendants intended and had
knowledge that their publications would be used, upon receipt, by
criminals and would-be criminals to plan and execute the crime of
murder for hire, in the manner set forth in the publications.
55
50. Id. at 840.
51. Greenburg, supra note 46, at 1.
52. Simpson, supra note 48, at B1.
53. Man Gets Life in Plot to Kill Ex-Wife, Disabled Son, Nurse, BALTIMORE SUN, May 17,
1996, at 6B.
54. Greenburg, supra note 46. For more on the Hit Man case, see Jane Kirtley, Hitting 'Hit
Man' in the Pocketbook, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Apr. 1996, at 51; Brown, supra note 25, at 13; All
Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 10, 1996), Transcript #2119-4. Canada has banned
two of Paladin Press' books, Kill Without Joy and How to Kill I. Other books by Paladin Press
include Counterfeit ID Made Easy, Homemade Semtex and Be Your Own Undertaker: How to
Dispose of a Dead Body. Andrea Neal, In Defense of the Most Unsavory, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Mar. 14, 1996, at A8.
55. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 836. See also Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Constitutional Suicide Pact?,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 1996, at 23. Taylor comments, "I like my freedom of speech as well as the
next fellow, but I'm with Smolla on this one-at least on the summary judgment issue." Id.
19971 BLOOD MONEY
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
On September 6, 1996, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. The court found that "Paladin engaged
in a marketing strategy intended to attract and assist criminals and
would-be criminals" and that "Paladin intended and had knowledge
that their publications would be used . . . to plan and execute the
crime of murder for hire, in the manner set forth in the publications."'
Despite those findings, the court rejected the plaintiff's arguments for
liability based on theories that included aiding and abetting,'
incitement, 58 and negligence.59
The court also said: "Whether there is a substantial connection or
a causal nexus between a publication similar to the material in
question and the ultimate acts of criminal defendants who are driven
with animus malus and criminal intent, so as to support civil liability
against the publishing company, has yet to be determined."'  While
Bruce Fein also argues for liability in the Hit Man case:
An arch legal principle holds persons civilly liable for the criminal conduct of
others in a variety of circumstances. Landlords are responsible for failing to undertake
safety measures to protect tenants from crime that might reasonably be anticipated.
Gun dealers are similarly liable for sale to customers who they had reason to believe
would use the firearms in crime. Bar owners are open to liability for alcohol sales to
intoxicants who subsequently commit mayhem in violation of DWI prohibitions.
Further, owners whose property is used in crime expose themselves to forfeiture for
neglecting reasonable precautions against such anti-social use. The theory behind these
liability rules is sound and simple: Citizens and businesses are obliged to act reasonably
to avoid assisting or facilitating crimes that might be reasonably anticipated. . . . As
applied to Paladin Press, the theory makes a persuasive case for liability.
Bruce Fein, Crime, Responsibility and Free Speech, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at A17. For
more discussion by Bruce Fein, see infra notes 393 and 400 and accompanying text, and note 416.
56. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 940 F. Supp. 836, 839 (S.D. Md. 1996).
57. Id. at 843. The court refused to apply holdings in criminal cases to the case at bar. Id.
58. The court considered the charge of "incitement to imminent, lawless activity" to be "the
only category of unprotected speech under which Hit Man could conceivably be placed." Id. at
841. But the court found a lack of imminence in the fact that Perry committed the murders more
than a year after purchasing the book. Id. at 847. As the court said, "Nothing in the book says
'go out and commit murder now!' Thus the court characterized the language in Hit Man as
"abstract teaching" instead of "incitement." Id. See also Mary Boyle, Judge Says Constitution
Protects Murder Manual, CHArrANOOGA FREE PRESS, Aug. 31, 1996, at B8. For a discussion of the
incitement standard, see infra Part V.
59. The court focused on the fact that Hit Man did not involve purely commercial speech.
"It is well settled that commercial speech is speech which does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction,"' the court pointed out. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841 (citations omitted).
Therefore, the court distinguished Hit Man from Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968
F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071 (1993), where a jury found negligence
liability based on a "gun for hire" ad. Id. at 848. For discussion of Braun v. Soldier of Fortune,
see infra Part II.A.
60. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848 (footnote omitted).
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the court is correct, an appellate court in Hyde v. City of Columbia did
find negligence liability when a paper published the name and address
of an abduction victim who was then stalked by her assailantP The
Rice court did not engage in a foreseeability analysis, however.
Clearly, the court did not relish its action:
The Court reads Hit Man in its entirety. Its content is enough to
engender nausea in many readers. This Court, quite candidly,
personally finds the book to be reprehensible and devoid of any
significant redeeming social value. Nevertheless, however loathsome
one characterizes the publication, Hit Man simply does not fall
within the parameters of any of the recognized exceptions to the
general First Amendment principles of freedom of speech.6
In short, in making its ruling in what the court called "a novel case
with unprecedented future implications,"' the court bowed to what it
considered to be First Amendment dictates, despite revulsion at the
book's content. The plaintiffs are appealing the decision.6a
Granted, the defendant's concession that they intended their
book to be used by criminals does not place the defendants in the most
sympathetic light. Nevertheless, to censor so-called "how to" books
creates a significant problem: How can one define a "how to" book?
Clearly, any well-written, easy to understand work of fiction that
explains the activities that are occurring could be used as a manual. A
mystery novel, true-crime book, or a news account could provide all
the information needed. The clearer the expression, the easier the
book (or television show or movie) would be to follow as a model.
4. Newspapers and TV News
The events that led to the suit against a newspaper started when
agents from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) raided the Branch Davidian compound outside Waco, Texas.
The followers of David Koresh seemed prepared. They wore black
61. For discussion of Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983), see infra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
62. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 849. See also Peter G. Chronis, Lawsuit of Boulder Publisher
Dismissed, DENVER PosT, Aug. 31, 1996, at B1.
63. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848. See also David Montgomery, Hit Man Book Didn't Kill,
Judge Rules: Md. Suit Argued Publisher Was Liable for 3 Murders, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1996, at
B1.
64. Karen Bowers, If Books Could Kill ... ; Paladin Press Notches a Victory in the Hit
Man Case, but the Fight Isn't Over, DENVER WESTWORD, Sept. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ALLNEWS File.
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"commando-style" outfits and ski masks.65 A shoot-out ensued, in
which four ATF agents were killed and sixteen wounded. At least two
of the Branch Davidian cult members died. ATF agent John
Risenhoover received wounds to his right hip, upper leg, and ankle. In
addition, he took four shots to the chest, but a bullet-proof vest
protected him.6
6
Risenhoover is suing the publishers of the Waco Tribune-Herald
for negligence. The original suit alleged, in part, that "the Waco
Tribune-Herald called David Koresh at the compound and informed
him that it had an urgent message for him and the other members of
the compound, which message informed them of an impending raid by
ATF and other officials." 67 This allegation has been dropped from the
suit.' The suit does allege, however, that the newspaper positioned
vehicles, reporters, and photographic equipment outside the
compound one or two hours before the agents' planned arrival. The
suit claims this activity by the newspaper "warned and notified the
occupants of the compound that a raid was to be conducted and
enabled the occupants to prepare and forcibly resist the ATF agents
65. Feds Work at Building Case Against Cult: 1 Member Arrested STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Mar. 11, 1993, at 6A.
66. Kathy Fair & Roy Bragg, ATF Agent's Suit Claims Newspaper Warned Cult, Hous.
CHRON., Mar. 18, 1993, at 1A. On February 26, 1994, a federal grand jury in San Antonio
acquitted 11 Branch Davidian members of conspiracy to murder and convicted seven members
on lesser charges, including voluntary manslaughter and weapons violations. Risenhoover,
standing outside the courtroom reportedly with tears in his eyes, commented, "We ought to just
hang up our badges." Lee Hancock, Branch Davidians Acquitted of Murder: 7 Found Guilty of
Lesser Charges, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 1994, at IA.
67. Fair & Bragg, supra note 66. See also Pierre Thomas & Edward Walsh, Agent Injured in
Cult Shootout Sues Waco Newspaper, WASH. POST, Mar. 18,1993, at A17.
68. Telephone Interview with David Mills, Attorney, WAco TRIB.-HERALD, (Mar. 21, 1996);
Telephone Interview with Mark England, Reporter, WAco TRiB.-HERALD, (Mar. 21, 1996). This
now-deleted allegation of a call by the newspaper seems to have resulted from an ambiguity
based on the word "England." According to England, David Koresh allegedly received a phone
call from "England." The plaintiff's attorney apparently construed that statement to mean that
Koresh received a call from Mark England, the reporter, instead of England, the country. As a
result, Mark England became a named defendant in Risenhoover's suit. Telephone interview
with Mark England, Reporter, WACO TRIB.-HERALD (Mar. 21, 1996). Judge Walter Smith
dismissed Mark England as a defendant in July 1996. Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp. 392,
411 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
In another suit, Ballesteros v. Cox Texas Publications, Inc., 936 F. Supp 392 (W.D. Tex.
1996), the allegation is that a TV photographer received a tip about the raid from a dispatcher for
an ambulance company that was on standby. Unable to find the compound, the photographer
allegedly stopped a postal carrier, who turned out to be Koresh's brother-in-law, who in turn
tipped off Koresh. See Janet Elliott, Paper Chase; Suit by A TF Agents Says Media Tipped Off
Koresh, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at 2.
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and other law enforcement officials."'  The paper's editor and
spokesman, Bob Lott, responded, "The injuries to Agent Risenhoover
and the deaths of and injuries to others are regrettable, but they were
not caused by this paper."7 Over 50 plaintiffs joined in the suit
against the Waco Tribune-Herald.71 Television station KWTX is also a
defendant.'
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment with Judge
Walter Smith of the United States District Court for the Western
69. Fair & Bragg, supra note 66. See also Thomas & Walsh, supra note 67; Sam Howe
Verhovek, Agent Injured by Cult Gunfire Blames Texas Newspaper in Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1993, at A16; J. Michael Kennedy, Waco Paper Tipped Off Cult, Agent Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1993, at A31; FBI: Cult Members Seek Answer on Legal Fate, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1993, at 4.
70. Hugh Aynesworth, 20 to 30 Cultists May Give Up After Next Meeting, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1993, at A10. The ATF is part of the Treasury Department, which issued a report on
the attack on the Waco compound. The report says that the ATF agents in command ordered the
raid even though they knew in advance that cult members had been forewarned and even though
the raid was not supposed to go forward if the "element of surprise" had been lost. Michael
Tackett, Cult Raid Bungled by A TF Report Finds Supervisors Ignored Facts, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1,
1993, at 1; See, e.g., Marshall Ingwerson, Report on Waco Attack Will Strengthen Case for Agency
Shake-Up: ATF may be DOA, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Sept. 30, 1993, at 11. The House
Judiciary Committee also conducted hearings into the disaster involving the Branch Davidian
Compound. See, e.g., Legal Expert Discusses House Hearing into Waco Disaster (CNN NEWS,
television broadcast, Apr. 28, 1993, Transcript No. 299-5).
For articles exploring the broader question of cults and violence, see, for example, Barbara
Kantrowitz with Andrew Murr, Peter Annin, Ginny Carroll & Tony Clifton, Secrets of the Cult:
The Messiah of Waco, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1993, at 56; Kenneth L. Woodward with Charles
Fleming, Spencer Ress, Scott Rafshoon & Elizabeth Ann Leonard, Secrets of the Cult: A Tower
of Babel," NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1993, at 60; Joe Treen, Joseph Harmes, Bob Stewart, Carlton
Stowers, John Dunn & Anne Maier, Zealot of God: On His Road to Armageddon, Would-Be
Messiah David Koresh Seduced His Followers into a Life of Paranoia, Violence and Sexual
Abuse, PEOPLE, Mar. 15, 1993, at 38; Lance Morrow, In the Name of God, TIME, Mar. 15, 1993, at
24; Richard Lacayo, Cult of Death; Holed up in a Texas Fortress, Koresh and His Followers
Fervently Believe He is Christ-and Till Death Do Them Part, TIME, Mar. 15, 1993, at 36.
71. Telephone interview with Mark England, Reporter, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, (Feb. 7,
1995). England characterizes the situation as one of being sued for "just being at the scene." Id.
According to Janet Elliott, more than 60 agents have filed suit against the newspaper, as well as a
television station and an ambulance company. Damages sought add up to over $1 billion. Elliott,
supra note 68. Texas Lawyer also uses the number 60. Media Can Be Sued By Davidian Raid
Agents, TEXAS LAW., Apr. 8, 1996, at 68. According to Lee Hancock, more than 70 agents and the
families of the four ATF agents who died have joined the suit. Lee Hancock, Waco News Media
Facing Trial in '93 Branch Davidian Firefight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 3, 1996, at A32.
According to Quill, "More than 100 lawsuits have been filed by Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms agents and their families against a Waco, Texas, newspaper and television station."
Michelle Millhollon, Waco Redux: Lawsuits Filed By Federal Agents Against a TV Station and a
Newspaper, QUILL, Oct. 1, 1995, at 23.
72. Elliott, supra note 68; Hancock, supra note 71.
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District of Texas:' The judge rejected the defendants' summary
judgment motion, saying:
[C]ommon sense would dictate that a reporter on the scene would
do everything possible to avoid detection in covering what is known
to be a secret law enforcement operation. Instead, the media
arrogantly descended on the compound as if the First Amendment
cloaked them with immunity from acting as reasonable individuals
under the circumstances. Their actions are particularly egregious
when considered in light of the fact that they knew how dangerous
Koresh and his followers were.
74
The judge concluded that it was "arguably foreseeable to the
newspaper and KWTX that the failure to provide any guidelines or
instructions to the reporters sent to the scene could result in the
Davidians being alerted to the impending raid."75
In the wake of the Waco tragedy and suit, the media have
undertaken much second-guessing of themselves.76 If a reporter had
called Koresh's Branch Davidians to say, "Hey, the FBI is going to
raid your compound momentarily," then liability would not seem so
farfetched. The report would have displayed an intent to warn an
armed compound of an impending invasion. To intentionally warn
under such circumstances seems clearly to constitute aiding and
abetting. From a journalistic perspective, to warn means becoming
part of a story and influencing its outcome rather than remaining an
objective reporter. Such a scenario would indeed be chilling. To
impose liability on a reporter who warns would send a message to
journalists that could be sent to any citizen-namely, do not interfere
with authorities who are attempting to carry out an assignment. (The
wisdom of the assignment itself constitutes a different question that
shall not be broached here.)
73. Telephone Interview with Jim Treanor, Attorney, WACO TRIB.-HERALD (Nov. 21, 1995).
74. Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp, 392,409 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
75. Hancock, supra note 71. Judge Smith also said that journalists are "no more free to
cause harm to others while gathering news than any other individual." Risenhoover, 936 F. Supp.
at 404. See also Jane Kirtley, Were the Media Negligent in Waco? AM. JOURNALISM REV., June
1996, at 46.
76. See, e.g., Soc'Y OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, WACO: WHAT WENT RIGHT AND WHAT WENT
WRONG (Nov. 1993); Joe Holley, The Waco Watch: From the Start of the Siege of the Cult
Compound, the Press Came Under Fire, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June 1993, at 50;
Rebecca Trounson, Deadly Finale at Mount Carmel Media's Role Under Scrutiny: Criticism
Remains of Early Coverage, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1993, at 17A. For commentary on Waco:
What Went Right, What Went Wrong, see Rebecca J. Tallent and J. Steven Smethers, Feeding the
Beast. Waco Coverage Driven by Technology, Competition, QUILL, Nov./Dec. 1993, at 20; Max
Jennings, Bad Ethics Recipe? Task Force Guidance "Half Baked," QUILL, Nov./Dec. 1993, at 18.
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Because the allegation that a reporter directly warned Koresh and
his followers has fallen out of this case, the case as it now exists poses a
scenario that is equally chilling, but in a different way. Imposing
liability could cause profound damage to First Amendment freedoms.
If mere presence constitutes a warning that leads to liability, then
consider what message that liability sends to journalists. Journalists
would, in essence, be told to stay away from any situation where
authorities might attempt an invasion because the journalists' mere
presence could constitute a warning. Besides high-profile incidents
such as in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, 7 or in Waco, hostage situations often
lead to invasions. Unfortunately, such situations are not that rare.
Should courts in effect discourage journalists from newsgathering
on a matter of extreme public importance, specifically, how public
authorities are performing (or misperforming) their public duties? A
message of "stand back and let the authorities do their jobs as they see
fit" would not seem compatible with the journalistic notion of
performing a watch-dog function. If liability were found in Waco,
journalists would not merely be told to stand back. They would be told
to stay away from the scene lest their activity be viewed as a warning
that bears the price tag of liability. This would not merely muzzle the
watchdog; it would chain the watchdog away from the activity that
needs watching. The restraining of journalists would harm the public
interest, given the critical role the media plays in a democratic society
by overseeing the authorities. Unleashing authorities while putting
journalists on a short leash would be shortsighted, at best. Judges
should wince at the thought of any decision that sends the message
that armed authorities should be entitled to act while journalists are
kept at bay.
77. At Ruby Ridge, FBI agents shot the fourteen-year-old son and the wife of white
separatist Randall C. Weaver during a 10-day siege of his remote mountain home in 1992. A 24-
member investigative team prepared a 524-page confidential study for the Justice Department,
concluding that federal agents at Ruby Ridge violated both their internal policies and the United
States Constitution. But the Clinton Administration, through Deval Johnston, Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights, declined any prosecutions for civil rights violations. See, e.g.,
David Johnston, Idaho Siege Report Says F.B.I. Agents Violated Procedure, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13,
1994, at Al. This decision provoked many angry commentaries. See, e.g., James Bovard,
Open Season on Gun Owners?: Dubious Decision at Justice, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1994, at A18;
Michale Costello, Feds Excuse Themselves for Civil Rights Abuses, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB.,
(Maine) Dec. 10, 1994, at 10A.
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These suits are but a few of the latest attempts to hold the press
responsible for the misdeeds of an evil-doer--a "third-party
tortfeasor"'  or "intervening actor"' in the bloodless language of the
law. What are the plaintiff's chances in these suits? A look at prior
case law gives some clues, but no definitive answers.
II
Negligence Precedents
A. Soldier of Fortune- A Frequent Defendant
Much sued, Soldier of Fortune magazine managed to slip through
the legal net of negligence-until January 1993. The United States
Supreme Court then decided not to hear the case of Braun v. Soldier
of Fortune Magazine, Inc., letting stand an award of $4,375,000 to
brothers Michael and Ian Braun for the murder of their father. t
The magazine, which caters to lovers of adventure, weaponry, and
all things military, printed this ad in June 1985: "GUN FOR HIRE:
37-year-old professional mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam veteran.
Discrete [sic] and very private. Bodyguard, courier and other special
78. Another suit in Texas involves the question of whether a newspaper is liable for injuries
suffered by a photographer who was an independent contractor sent out by a newspaper to take
a picture of a man accused of being a "drug czar" in earlier articles by that newspaper. The
newspaper did not warn the photographer about the earlier articles. The man criminally
assaulted the photographer, an occurrence which the photographer claims was reasonably
foreseeable. Guiterrez v. Scripps-Howard, No. 06-91-00076 CV (El Paso, Jan. 8, 1992). The trial
court granted a summary judgment to the newspaper, but the photographer appealed, and the
Eighth District Court of Appeals in El Paso reinstated the suit. Gutierrez v. Scripps-Howard, 823
S.W.2d 969 (1992). The appeals court subsequently denied a motion for rehearing but did correct
a factual error to reflect that the photographer was wearing a press pass at the time of the assault.
1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 403, at *3 (Feb. 12, 1992).
A situation abroad, which could not lead to suit in the U.S., certainly contributed to tragedy
and raised ethical concerns. Jonathan Alter writes:
The appalling aftermath of the Beijing massacre is a reminder that the media can
be used to imprison as well as liberate. The same Western TV transmissions that spread
word of the democracy movement were later scanned by Chinese authorities to help
round up suspects. But the dilemma for the press corps is not so much technological as
moral.
Jonathan Alter, Unwilling Informants? Candor in News Coverage Can Endanger Lives,
NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1989, at 29.
79. See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 200 (1983); Federal
Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., Ltd., 394 U.S. 404,410 (1969).
80. See, e.g., Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392,405 ("intervening actor").
81. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Mag., Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992),cert denied, 506
U.S. 1071 (1993).
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skills. All jobs considered."' Michael Savage, the aptly named man
from Knoxville, Tennessee, who placed the ad, received a call from
Richard Braun's business partner. On August 26, 1985, Savage and
two other men waited in ambush in Atlanta, Georgia, as Braun and his
16-year-old son Michael drove down the driveway of their home.
Using a MAC 11 automatic pistol, the hit-squad fired a bullet into the
son's thigh and wounded Braun, who rolled out of the car. As Braun
lay on the ground, one of the assassins pumped two fatal bullets into
Braun's head.83
During the ensuing wrongful-death trial against Soldier of
Fortune, the sons maintained the magazine had been negligent in
publishing the ad. The ad created an unreasonable risk that someone
might hire Savage for violent criminal activity, the sons argued. Savage
testified that he had no intention of soliciting anything but legitimate
work, but most of the thirty to forty responses per week to the ad
sought his services for murder, assault, or kidnapping.'
The sons introduced evidence of prior links between the
magazine's personal ads and other violent crimes.85 The jury brought
back a verdict of $2,375,000 in actual damages and $10,000,000 in
punitive damages. The trial court cut the punitive damages to
$2,000,000. 6 In August 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the judgment. The court approved of the
trial court's instruction to the jury that the magazine could be found
liable if-"on its face"-"the ad in question contains a clearly
identifiable unreasonable risk, that the offer in the ad is one to commit
a serious violent crime, including murder." 87 Note that the court said
that the risk had to be "clearly identifiable," not that the person who
was at risk (the victim) had to be clearly identifiable or that the
assailant had to be clearly identifiable. 8
82 Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112 (error in original).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1112-13.
86. Id. at 1114.
87. Id. at 1114,1118.
88. On the positive side for advertisers, the court of appeals said:
[Wlhile defendants owe a duty of reasonable care to the public, the magazine publisher
does not have a duty to investigate every ad it publishes. Defendants owe no duty to
the plaintiffs for publishing an ad if the ad's language on its face would not convey to
the reader that it created an unreasonable risk that the advertiser was available to
commit such violent crimes as murder.
Id. at 1120.
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Soldier of Fortune attempted to cloak itself in the First
Amendment.89 Indeed, the trial judge stressed the importance of First
Amendment considerations when he instructed the jury.9° So did the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion.91 The argument
failed, however 2 The magazine stood stripped bare of First
Amendment protection in this case.
But the magazine had won an earlier case, Eimann v. Soldier of
Fortune,' brought by the mother and son of a Texas woman who was
slain after her husband hired a hit man through an ad in the magazine.
The jury awarded the mother and son $9.4 million, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned the verdict. 4
In 1990, the Supreme Court let that appellate decision stand.95 Soldier
of Fortune escaped in the Eimann case because the judge instructed
the jury that it could find the magazine liable if the ad "'could
reasonably be interpreted' as an offer to engage in illegal activity."'9
This standard was too burdensome for the magazine, the appellate
court decided, because it could hold the magazine liable for crimes
committed after the running of an ambiguous ad.97
The Eimann ad was ambiguous: "EX-MARINES-67-69 'Nam
Vets, Ex-DI, weapons specialist-jungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk
assignments, U.S. or overseas."'9  The ad in Braun was more direct-
"Discrete [sic] and very private. . . . All jobs considered."'
89. Id. at 1116-17.
90. The judge said: "You should view the facts and these instructions with particular care in
this case, in view of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which protects the free flow of
truthful and legitimate information even when it is of a commercial rather than a political
nature." Id. at 1113.
91. The appellate court said, for instance: "This case poses a greater risk than one finds in
ordinary commercial speech cases that a state's regulatory regime or tort law will impermissibly
chill publishers from printing commercial speech that enjoys First Amendment protection." Id. at
1117.
92. The appellate court concluded that the negligence standard used by the trial court
"satisfied the First Amendment's interests in protecting the commercial and core speech at issue
in this case." Id. at 1118.
93. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), affid, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
94. Id. at 831,838.
95. Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Mag., Inc., 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
96. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 835.
97. Id. at 837-38.
9& Id. at 831.
99. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Mag., Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 1992)(error in
original), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071 (1993).
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In letting these two decisions stand, the Supreme Court appears
tacitly to agree that publishers can run ambiguous ads, but that they
cannot safely run more direct ads that solicit violence. 10 After Braun,
publishers must try to figure out which ads are safely ambiguous and
which are too direct.
Language from Braun says that publishers can be found liable
"only if the advertisement on its face would have alerted a reasonably
prudent publisher to the clearly identifiable unreasonable risk of harm
to the public that the advertisement posed."''1 Of course, it is standard
negligence law that if there is a foreseeable risk of harm that a
reasonably careful person would avoid, the person taking the risk and
causing the harm will pay the freight. But when is a risk clear enough?
In letting Braun stand, the Supreme Court tacitly acquiesced in a
two-fold expansion of the liability of the press for criminal acts that
indirectly result from publications. First, the press will be liable for
harm caused by news stories which reporters write. Second, the press
will be liable for advertisements submitted by outsiders as well.
Screening, in itself, is perhaps not very burdensome. However, the
second expansion is more burdensome-arguably a slide further down
a slippery slope. Not only will the press be liable when harm is
foreseeable to a specific individual, but also when there is a more
nebulous risk to the public. In effect, publishers will be exposed to the
possibility of a suit if they let a foreseeable public risk slip by.
Undoubtedly, publishers will feel some chill from trying to
distinguish ambiguous, legally safe ads from ads that do pose a public
100. For commentary on Braun, see David W. Kantaros, Case Comments: Constitutional
Law Striking an Appropriate Balance Between Negligence and Freedom of the Press for
Publishers, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 244 (1993); Timothy J. Tatro, Braun v. Soldier of Fortune: Tort
Law Enters the Braun's Age as Constitutional Safeguards for Commercial Speech Buckle 'Neath
the Crunch of Third-Party Liability, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (Fall 1993). For commentary on
Eimann, see Lisa F. Firenze, Publishers' Liability for Commercial Advertisements: Testing the
Limits of the First Amendment, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 137 (1990); J.D. Kilroy, Recent
Development: Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.: Fifth Circuit Limits Publisher
Liability for Ambiguous Advertisements, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1288 (1990); Michael I. Meyerson, This
Gun for Hire: Dancing in the Dark of the First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 267 (1990);
Donald B. Allegro and John D. LeDue, Case Comment Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune and
'Negligent Advertising' Action: Commercial Speech in an Era of Reduced First Amendment
Protection, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1989); Jan Jaben, Publishers Applaud Ad Victor, FOLIO,
Oct. 1, 1989, at 41; Neil L. Shapiro & Karl Olson, Advertiser Liability: Soldier of Fortune Cases
Take Deadly Aim at Publishers, 11 HASTINGS Com/Err L.J. 383 (1988).
For another case in which Soldier of Fortune was sued over an advertisement, see Norwood
v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987). There is no appellate
decision in this case.
101. 968 F.2d at 1115.
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threat by clearly soliciting criminal activity. Lawyers who advise the
press may well have an increased workload. In fact, an appeals court
judge who dissented in Braun wrote, "I remain convinced that the
language of the advertisement is ambiguous, rather than patently
criminal as the majority believes."'I On the other hand, it may not be
as easy now for business partners and spouses to find assassins. Soldier
of Fortune stopped publishing personal ads in 198 6 .113
In the Soldier of Fortune cases, the courts had to balance
interests. Here, First Amendment freedom of the press gave way to a
perceived interest in protecting the public from ads that pose an
unreasonable risk of violence. Although the guidelines are far from
precise, the brunt of the Braun message is clear: The pen may be
"mightier than the sword," but if the pen invites the sword, then the
press better beware.
B. Even a "Public Records" Defense Can Be Inadequate
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court let stand a Missouri
case, Hyde v. City of Columbia,1' which allowed a negligence suit
brought by Sandra Hyde against a newspaper, The Columbia Daily
Tribune. As Hyde walked down the main street of Columbia,
Missouri, after midnight in August 1980, a man with a red beard and
red hair, driving a red Mustang, pulled alongside her. He opened his
door, leveled a sawed-off shotgun at her, and ordered her to get in.
She did. He then demanded, "You will do what I want you to do or I
will blow your brains out." As he drove around a corner, Hyde jumped
out of the car and ran to safety in a nearby disco. Hyde reported the
incident to the police. Of course, she gave her name and address-
facts which her assailant lacked until a Tribune reporter obtained a
copy of the police report. The newspaper published her name and
address the next day. Then, according to Hyde, the man started
terrorizing her, stalking her at her home and workplace and making
phone calls to give her messages such as, "I'm glad you're not dead
102. Id. at 1122 (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
103. Ron Martz, Slain Man's Family Pleased at Court Ruling on Ad, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Jan. 12, 1993, at A4; High Court Rejects Free-Press Arguments in 2 Cases, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 12,1993, at A4.
104. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226
(1983). For commentary on the case, see Douglas 0. Linder, When Names Are Not News, They're
Negligence: Media Liability for Personal Injuries Resulting from the Publication of Accurate
Information, 52 UMKC L. REV. 421 (1984).
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yet, I have plans for you before you die," and, "I wanted to refresh
yourmemory of who I am before I kill you tonight."1 5
Hyde sued, alleging negligence by the city in disclosing her name
and address and negligence by the newspaper in printing her name
and address.10 The defendants countered that the disclosed
information was a public record under Missouri's Sunshine Law. 7
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, accepting the public-
record defense.10 However, the Court of Appeals for the Western
District of Missouri reversed and held that Sandra Hyde did indeed
have valid grounds to sue for negligence. The court concluded: "[I]t
was reasonably foreseeable that the publication of the name and
address of the victim, while the assailant was still at large, was a
temptation to [the assailant] to inflict an intentional harm upon the
victim-a foreseeable risk the . . .defendants had a duty to
prevent."'1
In flatly rejecting the "Sunshine Law" defense, the court used the
following reductio ad absurdum argument:
To construe the Sunshine Law to open all criminal investigation
information to anyone with a request ...courts constitutional
violations of the right of privacy of a witness or other citizen
unwittingly drawn into the criminal investigation pro-
cess . . . . Such a construction leads to the absurdity ... that an
assailant unknown as such to the authorities, from whom the victim
has escaped, need simply walk into the police station, demand name
and address or other personal information without possibility of
lawful refusal so as to intimidate the victim as a witness or commit
other injury.i
n
To avoid what the court called an "absurd" conclusion, it held that
"the name and address of a victim of crime who can identify an
assailant not yet in custody is not a public record under the Sunshine
Law. " 111
By letting the Hyde case stand, the United States Supreme Court
sent the message that newspapers could be found liable for printing a
news story that exposed a specific victim to an unreasonable,
foreseeable risk of harm-even though the defendant arguably was
105. 637 S.W.2d at 253-55 n. 2.
106. Id. at 255-56.
107. Id. at 254,258.
108. Id. at 254.
109. Id. at 273.
110. Id. at 263.
111. Id.
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using public records. In fact, a California appeals court cited Hyde
when it let a woman sue the Los Angeles Times after the paper
reported her name in connection with her discovery of the dead, nude
body of her roommate who had been beaten, raped, and strangled.
1 2
The reporter, a summer intern, obtained the name through the
coroner's office.113 Again, the court did not accept the public-record
defense.'
A case with facts similar to Hyde's but an opposite result is
Florida Star v. B.J.F., which the United States Supreme Court did
review."5 On First Amendment grounds, the Court overturned
compensatory and punitive damage awards to a rape victim whose
name had been accidentally printed by the newspaper. A Florida
statute prohibited publication of rape victims' names,116 and the victim
sued for the paper's negligent violation of the statute. The paper's
problems arose when a reporter-trainee wrote a verbatim copy of a
police report on a "blank duplicate" of the police form. A reporter
then wrote a paragraph about the crime, which the paper published in
its "Police Reports" section along with fifty-three other entries under
the subheading of "Robberies.""' 7 The published paragraph said:
[B.J.F.] reported on Thursday, October 20, she was crossing
Brentwood Park, which is in the 500 block of Golfair Boulevard,
enroute to her bus stop, when an unknown black man ran up behind
the lady and placed a knife to her neck and told her not to yell. The
suspect then undressed the lady and had sexual intercourse with her
before fleeing the scene with her 60 cents, Timex watch and gold
112. Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Ct. of San Diego County, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988).
113. Id. at 558.
114. Id.
115. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
116. Section 794.03 of the Florida code is still on the books, although the Supreme Court
severely criticized it in B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 539-41, and although a Florida trial court found it
unconstitutional in the prosecution of The Globe for naming the rape victim in the William
Kennedy Smith rape trial. See, e.g., Tabloid is Cleared in Kennedy Rape Case, Hous. CHRON.,
Oct. 25, 1991, at 18A; Timothy Clifford, Ban on Naming Victim Thrown Out, NEWSDAY, Oct. 25,
1991, at 4; Florida Law Struck Down Barring Rape Victim Name Disclosure, UPI, Oct. 24, 1991,
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, UPI file.
The Florida Court of Appeal for the Fourth District agreed with the trial court that the
statute is unconstitutional. Florida v. Globe Comm. Corp., No. 91-3112, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS
7991 (Fla. App. Aug. 4, 1993); Appeals Panel Throws Out Rape Statute, UPI, Aug. 5, 1993,
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, UPI File.
117. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 527.
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necklace. Patrol efforts have been suspended concerning this
incident because of a lack of evidence. 
18
In the wake of this publication, B.J.F.'s mother received calls from a
man threatening to rape B.J.F. again. Testifying about her emotional
distress, B.J.F. said she had to move, change her phone number, seek
police protection, and consult a mental-health counselor.
119
The similarities between B.J.F. and the Hyde case are obvious: a
newspaper used a police report to name a victim whose assailant
previously did not know her name and who was still at large. However,
the Court let Hyde stand, but it reversed B.J.F. It is important to note
that the decision in B.J.F. is a narrow one. While the Court held that
"imposing damages on appellant for publishing B.J.F.'s name violates
the First Amendment," the Court also specifically declined "to hold
broadly that truthful publication may never be punished consistent
with the First Amendment."' The Court made clear in B.J.F. that it
would decide such cases on a case-by-case basis, carefully weighing the
interests presented by each particular case: "We continue to believe
that the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in
clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying
on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate
context of the instant case. ' 121
But the Court did seem to offer greater protection when public
records are used. Showing concern that "timidity and self-censorship"
by the media could occur, the Court said:
A contrary rule depriving protection to those who rely on the
government's implied representations of the lawfulness of
dissemination, would force upon the media the onerous obligation
of sifting through government press releases, reports and
pronouncements to prune out material arguably unlawful for
publication. This situation could inhere even where the newspaper's
sole object was to reproduce, with no substantial change, the
government's rendition of the event in question.i
Although comforting, this broad statement by the Court is merely
dictum. The opinion in B.J.F. emphasizes the importance of case-by-
case determinations. The Court, in discussing protection of news
118. Id. at 527. This was the first time the newspaper had published a rape victim's name. See
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: First Amendment Protects Paper that Named Rape
Victim, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1989, at B9.
119. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 528.
120. Id. at 532.
121. Id. at 533.
122. Id. at 536.
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media that use information released by the government, was applying
its earlier decision in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.1 3 The Court
in Daily Mail held in 1979 that a state cannot punish truthful
publication by a newspaper of the lawfully obtained name of a juvenile
who allegedly committed murder.' The Court in B.J.F. applied the
following principle from Daily Mail: "If a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order."'2
In 1983, the Court let the Hyde decision stand,' thereby
permitting a negligence action against a newspaper that printed the
name of an abduction victim-a name lawfully received from a
government agency, the police department lz7 Also sobering is the
United States Supreme Court's letting stand a more than $4.3 million
judgment against Soldier of Fortune magazine in 1993. 8
In short, no Supreme Court decision exists which grants blanket
immunity from liability to news media that publish information that
reasonably prudent journalists would not print. If there is
foreseeability of harm, and the harm occurs, the media may face
liability for negligence even if the information comes from police
records or other government sources. 129
123. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). For discussion of Daily Mail in B.J.F., see 491 U.S. at 533-37.
124. See 443 U.S. at 101-06.
125. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103). The Texas Court of
Appeals for the Second District cited B.J.F. for its use of the principle from the Daily Mail
opinion that publication of information which is lawfully obtained may only be punished if the
state establishes "an interest of the highest order" which must be protected. Doe v. Star
Telegram, Inc., 864 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. App. 1993). Jane Doe sued the Star Telegram for
invasion of privacy after it published two articles about a sexual assault on her. Although the
paper did not use her name, it printed that she was the owner of a business and published her
business address along with the make and model of her car. The trial court granted the
newspaper's motion for summary judgment, but the appeals court remanded the case on the sole
issue of whether the newspaper obtained the information lawfully. Id. at 791.
126. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
127. Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 253-55.
128. See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text.
129. The government source was the coroner's office in the 1988 Times-Mirror case. Times
Mirror Co. v. Superior Ct. of San Diego County, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). See
supra note 112 and accompanying text on the Times-Mirror case.
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III
Strict Liability
A. Can the Printed Word Be a Product?
When the printed word has been part of a chain of events leading
to physical harm or even death, plaintiffs have sometimes asked courts
to treat the printed word like any other commercial product and to
hold publishers liable under a theory of strict liability. With only two
exceptions, such attempts have failed. In the first exception, courts
have held the publishers of faulty aeronautical charts liable for the
disasters they have caused. In the second, courts have assigned liability
when the printed word appeared as a warranty. Otherwise, attempts to
treat the printed contents of magazines, newspapers, or books as
products have failed. Courts have looked beyond product liability
theory into the Constitutional heart of the matter-the First
Amendment.
1. A Magazine With a Supplement on Shooting Sports'Prevailed in a Strict
Liability Case
A 1993 Texas case demonstrates the power of the First
Amendment as a shield when plaintiffs argue that words on a printed
page constitute a mere product. The facts of Way v. Boy Scouts of
America1m are compelling. A 12-year-old boy named Rocky died when
he and some friends were playing with a rifle that discharged. They
had been reading an issue of Boys' Life, a magazine published by the
Boy Scouts of America, which included a 16-page advertising
supplement on shooting sports and how to earn merit badges for
shooting. Rocky's mother sued, claiming the supplement caused her
son's death. Her theories were negligence in publishing the
supplement and strict liability for a defective product, namely, the
magazine with its supplement.13'
The appellate court rejected her negligence claim, concluding that
Rocky's "experimentation" with the rifle was not a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the supplement.' 2 Rocky had been
unsupervised, while the supplement emphasized the importance of
supervision and safe and responsible gun use.1 Weighing the three
130. 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1993).
131. Id. at 232.
132. Id. at 236.
133. Id.
factors of negligence-risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury-
against the social utility of the conduct,' the court said:
Given the pervasiveness of firearms in society, we conclude that
encouragement of safe and responsible use of firearms by minors in
conjunction with Boy Scout and other supervised activities is of
significant social utility. Also included in our consideration of the
social utility of publishing the supplement is our recognition of the
pervasiveness of advertising in society and the important role it
plays. . . . The weight we attach to the social utility of advertising
in this case is further strengthened by the fact that the supplement
provided useful information about lawful products.
1
Turning to the question of strict liability, the court noted that the
Texas Supreme Court had adopted the strict liability theory of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, which states: "(1) one
who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his [or her] property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his [or her] property . * * * 31
The court noted that to have a cause of action for products
liability, one must first have a "product" falling within the definition of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.137 In this case, however, the court
134. Id. at 234.
135. Id. at 236 (citation omitted).
136. The passage continues:
[I]f
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his [or her]
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965), quoted in Way, 856 S.W.2d at 238. Courts and
scholars recognize the pervasiveness of this section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. As
professors Henderson and Twerski wrote:
Only rarely do provisions of the American Law Institute's Restatements of the
Law rise to the dignity of holy writ. Even more rarely do individual comments to
Restatement sections come to symbolize important, decisive developments that
dominate judicial thinking. Nevertheless, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts is such a provision. Literally thousands upon thousands of products liability
decisions in the past twenty-five years have explicitly referred to, and come to grips
with, that section.
James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512 (1992).
137. Way, 856 S.W.2d at 238.
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said the dead boy's mother was not claiming that the physical
condition of the magazine itself was dangerous but that its "ideas and
information" encouraged children to engage in dangerous activities."3
Ideas and information are "intangible characteristics, not tangible
properties," according to the court."3 Drawing a distinction between
"tangible and intangible aspects of a publication," the court quoted
this passage from a federal case: "A book containing Shakespeare's
sonnets consists of two parts, the material and the print therein, and
the ideas and expression thereof. The first may be a product, but the
second is not. Products liability law is geared to the tangible world.""1t°
The court concluded that the "ideas, thoughts, words, and information
conveyed" by Boys' Life and its supplement did not constitute a
product.'
2. The Publisher of a Textbook Giving Medical Advice Prevailed
In 1988, a federal trial court in Maryland also ruled against a
plaintiff's strict liability claim. The case of Jones v. J.B. Lippincott
Co.42 involved an unfortunate, constipated nursing student who
treated herself with a hydrogen peroxide enema after consulting a
textbook published by J.B. Lippincott. She injured herself and then
sued. In rejecting her strict liability claim, the court pointed out that
other courts have applied strict liability to publishers only in cases
involving aeronautical maps or charts.143 In applying strict liability in
those cases, courts drew an analogy between airline charts and other
devices for navigation, such as compasses or radar finders, which
would prove dangerous if defectivel The court said: "No case has
extended Section 402A to the dissemination of an idea or knowledge
138. Id. at 239.
139. Id.
140. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991), quoted in Way, 856
S.W.2d at 239. Winter involved plaintiffs who read The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms, gathered
and ate poison mushrooms, and then sued. See infra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
The court in Way also quoted Herceg v. Hustler Magazine: "The Court is aware of no court
which has held that the content of a magazine or other publication is a product within the
meaning of § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. Rather, they have held to the contrary."
Way, 856 S.W.2d at 239 (quoting Herceg v. Hustler Mag., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983)).
For a discussion of Herceg, see infra notes 268-272 and accompanying text.
141. Way, 856 S.W.2d at 239. For discussion of Way and related cases, see Special Report:
Products Liability Claims Against Publishers: Can Information Be a Defective Product?, BNA
PRODUCT LIABILITY DAILY, Nov. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAPLD File.
142. 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988).
143. Id. at 1217.
144. For the cases on aeronautical charts, see infra notes 147-157 and accompanying text.
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in books or other published material. Indeed to do so could chill
expression and publication which is inconsistent with fundamental free
speech principles."'
In granting summary judgment to the book publisher, the trial
court said Lippincott had made no warranties regarding the content of
the book and owned no duty of care to the injured woman. The court
applied this doctrine: "If a publisher serves the function of publishing
the contents of an author, other than one of its own employees for
whom it would be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it
has no duty for the contents."'
3. Publishers of Aeronautical Charts Lost for Producing "Defective" Products
As examples of courts holding a company responsible for the
aeronautical charts it produced, two courts held Jeppesen & Company
liable in 1985. In Brocklesby v. United States,147 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that a graphic approach chart is a "product"
and that it was a "defective product for purposes of analysis under
section 402A."' Jeppesen had used Federal Aviation Administration
data to create a chart for the airport at Cold Bay, Alaska. Six crew
members who relied on the faulty chart died in a resulting airplane
crash.149 The court concluded that all requirements for strict liability
under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts had been
met.' ° Had Jeppesen merely republished government data, the court
145. Lippincott, 694 F. Supp. at 1217 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323
(1974)). In Gertz, the Supreme Court held "so long as they do not impose liability without fault,"
states could decide for themselves the "appropriate standard of liability" for media that libel
private individuals. Id. at 347. The Court explained its reasoning for rejecting strict liability: "Our
decisions recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to
guarantee the accuracy of his (or her] factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship."
Id. at 340.
146. Lippincott, 694 F. Supp. at 1216-17 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
147. 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985).
14& Id. at 1295. Mass production and mass distribution are key elements for courts to find
charts to be products under section 402A. See, e.g., Halstead v. U.S. Jeppesen & Co., 535 F.
Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1982):
Jeppesen mass produced and distributed thousands of charts on the aviation market.
Implicit in their presence on the market was the representation that the purchaser
could rely on their information safely. Exposing defendant Jeppesen's conduct to strict
products liability is thus entirely appropriate. Hence, this court finds that the Jeppesen
navigational charts are products for the purposes of § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1965).
Id. at 791.
149. Brockelsby, 767 F.2d at 1291.
150. id. at 1294-96.
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said, Jeppesen would not have been liable, but the charts were a
conversion, not a mere republication, of the government data.,,l The
charts were instead a new product. Further, Jeppesen had made the
following representation about its charts:
When pilots compare approach plates ... for information,
for readability ...they .choose Jeppesen. Why? Because the
format of Jeppesen charts was designed by pilots, for
pilots, and has been time-tested and proven by
instrument pilots throughout the world. Every necessary
detail is clearly indicated .. . . Jeppesen approach plates
include ...EVERYTHING you need for a smooth transition
from enroute to approach segment of your flight.152
A California appeals court also found liability in Fluor Corp. v.
Jeppesen & Co. ,m which involved a Lockheed Jet Star that crashed
into the side of Johnson Hill in New York, killing everyone on board.
Johnson Hill was not listed on Jeppesen's chart. The trial court did not
instruct the jury about strict products liability. 1' The appellate court
reversed, saying, "At a minimum ...the court should have informed
the jury that this chart could 'be found defective in design .. .,1
According to the court, characterizing the charts as products would
serve the policy of protecting defenseless victims and spreading the
cost of compensating them.L% As the court pointed out, "here the
inclusion of Johnson Hill on respondent's chart in accordance with its
own design rules apparently could have been accomplished with ease
at negligible cost .... "
151. Id. at 1298.
152. Id. at 1298. Cf. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969),
discussed infra notes 230-236 and accompanying text where a Good Housekeeping warranty led
to liability.
153. 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
154. Fluor, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
155. Id. at 73.
156. Fluor, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71(quoting Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112,
112 (1982)).
157. Fluor, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 72. Jeppesen has been a frequent defendant. In Saloomey v.
Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983), affg Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D.
Conn. 1982), a Jeppesen chart indicated that a West Virginia airport contained a "full instrument
landing system." It did not, and a fatal plane crash occurred. Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 673. The
appellate court found "adequate evidence" to uphold the jury's finding that the chart was
defective. Id. at 677.
In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 463 F. Supp. 94 (D. Nev. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981), a plane crashed as it approached the Las Vegas,
Nevada airport. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the chart was "unreasonably
dangerous and a defective product." Jeppesen did win an earlier case. Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk,
593 P.2d 924 (1978), involved the crash of a Pan Am 707 cargo jet into Mt. Kamunay in the
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4. The Publisher of Tire-Dimension Standards Prevailed
Theories of strict liability and breach of warranty failed in a 1985
New York case, Beasock v. Dioguardi Enterprises.m A man died when
the 16-inch truck tire 'he was trying to inflate on a 16.5-inch rim
exploded.u9 The defendant, Tire and Rim Association (TRA),
published dimensional standards, allowing persons to interchange tires
and rims produced by different manufacturers. 11° The court pointed
out that TRA did not manufacture either the tire or rim and
concluded:
The only products TRA is responsible for placing in the stream of
commerce are its publications. Although these publications
contained the dimensional specifications for the tire and rim in
question, the publications themselves did not produce the injuries
and thus cannot serve as the basis for the imposition of
liability .... 161
5. The Publisher of a Science Textbook Prevailed
Prior to Beasock, another New York "strict liability" case, Walter
v. Bauer, failed in 1981.162 The case involved an injury to the eye of a
child who tried an experiment, from a science textbook, using a ruler
and a rubber band. In Walter, the plaintiff argued that the "product," a
book entitled Discovering Science 4, was defective "because it
contained an unreasonable risk of harm by placing dangerous
instrumentalities or [sic] rubber bands and ruler [sic] in the hands of
fourth grade students" and because the defendant failed to warn of the
dangers. 163 Ruling for the defendants, the judge said the child "was not
injured by use of the book for the purpose for which it was destined,
i.e., to be read."1' But more important, according to the judge, were
the First Amendment considerations. Speaking of the possible
"chilling effect" of imposing liability, the judge asked: "Would any
author wish to be exposed to liability for writing on a topic which
Philippines. The Jeppesen chart did not show Mt. Kamunay, and the crew died. Id. at 925-26. But
misuse of the chart by the crew spared Jeppesen from liability under either strict liability or
misrepresentation that its charts were accurate. Id. at 930.
158. 494 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. 1985).
159. Id. at 974-75.
160. Id. at 975-76.
161. Id. at 978.
162. 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1981).




might result in physical injury? e.g., How to cut trees; How to keep
bees?"165
B. The Courts' Logic Holding Publishers of Aeronautical Charts
Responsible but Releasing Other Publishers from Liability Is
Contradictory
A basic inconsistency in case law appears if one compares the two
Jeppesen cases decided in 1985, the Beasock v. Dioguardi Enterprises
case decided in 1985, and the Walter v. Bauer case decided in 1981.
Jeppesen, the maker of aeronautical charts, was held strictly liable for
deaths. However, if the logic in the exploding tire case, Beasock v.
Dioguardi Enterprises, is followed, Jeppesen could not be held
accountable for the air-crash deaths. The Beasock logic indicates that
a company is only responsible for the product it places in the stream of
commerce, namely its publications, and that "the publications
themselves did not produce the injuries and thus cannot serve as the
basis for the imposition of liability." 166 By this logic, Jeppesen's charts
per se did not cause the deaths. In the Jeppesen cases, other factors,
such as a hill into which a plane crashed, caused the deaths.
Nonetheless, Jeppesen profited by selling charts upon which
others relied, as the California court said in the Fluor case, and it
made sense as a policy matter to hold Jeppesen responsible for the
damage it set in motion. 167 But the same policy would seem to apply in
the Beasock case because TRA profited by selling information about
interchanging tires and rims produced by different manufacturers.
Beasock and the two Jeppesen cases of Brocklesby and Fluor cannot
be reconciled. They present mutually exclusive, diametrically opposed
views.
Jeppesen was no more negligent than the publisher of the
misinformation on tire and rim compatibility. Someone has to bear the
cost: Arguably, this should be the person or entity trying to profit
from supplying (mis)information.
In the same vein as the Jeppesen cases, if a publisher is making
money by selling information, or misinformation as it were, why does
the law not hold the publisher responsible? The policy considerations
of protecting defenseless victims and spreading the cost of
165. Id. at 823.
166. 494 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
167. Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). For coverage of
Fluor, see supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
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compensating them would apply equally in all cases.1" Whether the
information was for aeronautical purposes or for interchanging tires
and rims seems irrelevant. Any persons relying on books purporting to
provide reliable information would seem to be in the same position as
pilots relying on aeronautical charts. For instance, in Jones v. J.B.
Lippincott Co.,169 the same policy considerations of protecting the
nursing student who injured herself with a hydrogen peroxide enema
after consulting Lippincott's textbook would apply as in the Jeppesen
cases, as would the policy of spreading the cost of compensating her
for her injury.170
Consider carefully the unanswered question posed by the court in
Walter v. Bauer: "Would any author wish to be exposed to liability for
writing on a topic which might result in physical injury? e.g., How to
cut trees; How to keep bees?" 171 One could answer, yes, a responsible
author who is confident of his or her information should be willing to
face such exposure, because accepting liability would contribute to
social good. Liability would help to protect innocent persons who
relied on misinformation. For instance, if an ill-informed author, for
monetary reasons, wrote an inaccurate book on beekeeping, thereby
padding his or her pockets with money from hapless readers, that
author should be held responsible for the consequences of the
inaccuracies for the same policy reasons under which Jeppesen was
held responsible. Say, if an ill-informed author offered a honey-
gathering plan, that would lead almost inexorably to the extractor
being seriously stung. The same policy considerations of protecting the
innocent victim and of spreading the cost of compensating him or her
for injury would apply equally well in the case of Jeppesen's charts or
books on bee-keeping. Certainly, being stung by many angry bees can
lead to painful, foreseeable injuries, or even death, as can crashing a
plane into an uncharted hill. And having a tree fall on one likewise
could lead to painful, foreseeable injuries or death.
"But for" causality is a primary issue when assigning liability to
publishers. But for Jeppesen's mistake, but for the misinformation on
tire and rim compatibility and on the enema, injuries could have been
avoided. The dangers were all foreseeable. The same policy reasons
168. Fluor, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
169. For coverage of Lippincott, see supra notes 142-146 and accompanying text.
170. One commentator suggests liability in those cases where the publisher has'the
"subjective intent that the material be relied upon." Lisa A. Powell, Products Liability and the
First Amendment: The Liability of Publishers for Failure to Warn, 59 IND. L.J. 503, 526 (1983).
171. 439 N.Y.S.2d 821,823 (1981).
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for holding the defendants liable should apply in all these cases.
Consider the principle that if a physical book or magazine did not
cause the problem, then there shall be no liability for the
(mis)information contained within. Applying this principle in Braun v.
Soldier of Fortune, the magazine would have suffered no liability
because clearly it was not the magazine that killed Braun; rather, a gun
fired by thugs hired through the ad run by Soldier of Fortune killed
him. Nor did the physical newspaper in Hyde cause the problem;
instead, a deranged assailant armed with a sawed-off shotgun and
knowledge of Hyde's name and address caused the problem. But the
information in the magazine and in the newspaper in the Soldier of
Fortune and Hyde cases were links in a chain of causality. The risk was
foreseeable; the harm occurred; and the defendants in those two cases
were found liable.
But limits to publishers' liability should exist, lest the First
Amendment become a victim of a rampant social policy that tries to
protect innocent victims and spread the cost of compensating them. As
courts have struggled with the issue of how far to extend a publisher's
liability, they have required elements besides mere publication of
erroneous information that led to injury.
IV
Risky Business: Endorsements or Sponsorships
A. Lack of Endorsement Offers Protection for Media
As long as a publisher does not endorse a product, courts have
not found liability, nor a duty to check for accuracy, nor a duty to
warn. Furthermore, a "misrepresentation" theory has yet to prevail. A
form of caveat emptor seems to prevail in the absence of an
endorsement: Let the user of the information beware. He or she relies
on the accuracy of the information at his or her own peril.
1. A Toxic-Shock Victim Lost Because of a Lack of Endorsement by a
Magazine
One case was won by a defendant magazine that did not endorse
products but conceded it would have been liable if it had. In the 1987
case of Walter v. Seventeen Magazine,'12 a young woman sued for
injuries following hospitalization for toxic shock syndrome. The
172. 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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plaintiff claimed she had relied on an ad in Seventeen Magazine for
Playtex tampons, and sued the magazine for negligence and product
liability, among other theories. She argued that Seventeen knew of the
danger because Rely tampons, which contained the same harmful
substance as Playtex tampons, had already been removed from the
marketplace. 173 In its defense, the magazine argued that it had no duty
to investigate products it advertises and that it was not liable for the
products' defects unless it endorsed the products.174 The appellate
court agreed with Seventeen, saying:
[W]e are loathe to create a new tort of negligently failing to
investigate the safety of an advertised product. Such a tort would
require publications to maintain huge staffs scrutinizing and testing
each product offered. The enormous cost of such groups, along with
skyrocketing insurance rates, would deter many magazines from
accepting advertising, hastening their demise from lack of revenue.
Others would comply, but raise their prices beyond the reach of the
average reader. Still others would be wiped out by tort judgments,
never to revive. Soon the total number of publications in circulation
would drop dramatically.
Perhaps this dire possibility is one reason the United States
Supreme Court has been so vigilant about linking commercial
speech to the First Amendment.
7 5
2. A Youth Injured by Fireworks Lost Because of a Lack of Endorsement by a
Magazine
In the 1974 case of Yuhas v. Mudge,176 a New Jersey court
embraced the idea that a magazine should only face liability if it
endorsed a product. In that case, a minor had been injured after an
adult bought fireworks advertised in Popular Mechanics Magazine.
The appeals court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendants,
explaining the plaintiff's theory for recovery as follows: the publishers
produce "a pseudo-scientific publication which has acquired an 'aura
of authentativeness' in the public's mind," and thus had a duty to test
"inherently dangerous products" advertised in the magazine."7 The
court then rejected the plaintiff's theory of liability, holding that the
173. Id.
174. Id. at 101-02.
175. Id. at 102-03. The Walters court distinguished its case from Hanberry v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 158 (1996). For coverage of Hanberry, see infra notes 230-236 and accompanying text.
176. 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. 1974).
177. Id. at 825.
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magazine had no such duty unless it guaranteed, warranted, or
endorsed the product."7
3. A Travel Guide's Publisher Won Because the Guide Made No Endorsement
Similarly, in a 1992 case, Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel
Publications, Inc. ,' the Supreme Court of Hawaii emphasized a lack
of guarantee in ruling for the publisher. The plaintiff sued Fodor's
Travel Publications, Inc., for failure to warn about dangerous
conditions at a Hawaiian beach.18° Fodor's had published a travel
guide, Fodor's Hawaii 1988, written by a travel writer rather than
Fodor's. James Birmingham bought a copy of the book, and based on
information it contained, he visited Kekaha Beach to body surf, where
he was injured. In ruling for Fodor's, the court pointed out that the
publisher had not guaranteed or endorsed the locations described in
its guides.18 According to the court's review of case law, no court had
ever held a publisher liable for negligence in a personal injury case
where the plaintiff relied on published information "unless the
publisher authored or guaranteed the information.' 18" The court
concluded that absent authorship or a guarantee, Fodor's had "no
duty to investigate and warn its readers of the accuracy of the contents
of its publications."" The court also rejected the argument that
Fodor's guide was a "product," thus rejecting a strict liability theory."l
4. The Publisher of a Mushroom Guide Prevailed Because it Owed No Duty to
Check Accuracy
"Failure to check accuracy" also failed as a negligence theory
used against another book publisher in a 1991 case, Winter v. G.P.
Putnam's Sons.1" The publishers of The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms
prevailed when sued by California mushroom mavens who, while
referring to the encyclopedia, misidentified mushrooms as edible and
became very ill as a result of eating their poisonous harvest. In a
17& Id. The court also said: "To impose the suggested broad legal duty upon publishers of
nationally circulated magazines, newspapers and other publications, would not only be
impractical and unrealistic, but would have a staggering adverse effect on the commercial world
and our economic system." Id.
179. 833 P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992).
180. Id. at 73.
181. Id.
182 Id. at 75.
183. Id. at 76.
184. Id. at 77-79.
185. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991); see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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strong opinion, the federal appellate court rejected the argument that
the publishers were negligent for not checking the accuracy of the
encyclopedia. 186 Although a publisher may assume the burden of
checking accuracy, the court held it has no duty to do so, adding:
"Were we tempted to create this duty, the gentle tug of the First
Amendment and the values embodied therein would remind us of the
social costs.""i
5. A Book Dealer Who Sold a Cookbook Prevailed Because it Made No
Implied Warranty
Similarly, a book dealer had no duty to check information. A
Florida Court of Appeal found in the 1977 case of Cardozo v. True1"
that a distributor of a cookbook containing a recipe that included a
poisonous plant was not liable for physical injury as there was no
implied warranty. Ingrid Cardozo purchased the book Trade Winds
Cookery from Ellie's, a retail book dealer. She followed a recipe for
cooking the Dasheen plant, commonly called "elephant's ears." She
ate a small slice of the uncooked plant as she worked and
"immediately experienced coughing, gasping and intense stomach
cramps that persisted several days, despite medical care." 1" The
plaintiff contended the book failed to warn of danger, and "Ellie's
impliedly warranted that the book was reasonably fit for its intended
use.' " The court agreed with the defendant's characterization of the
situation: Ellie's conceded that it might be subject to the Uniform
Commercial Code's doctrine of implied warranty, but claimed the
warranty was limited to the physical characteristics of the books."9
Also, Ellie's argued that it would be impossible for book sellers to test
every recipe in books they offer."9 Using a reductio ad absurdum
argument, Ellie's claimed that stores disseminating information would
need expertise in every field in which they offered books. This burden,
according to Ellie's, would drive book stores out of business,
ultimately encroaching on freedom of expression.1' The court agreed:
186. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035-36.
187. Id. at 1037; See also Note, Ninth Circuit Holds that California's Products Liability Law
Does Not Cover False Statements in a Book, 105 HAv. L. REv. 1147 (1992).
188. 342 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
189. Id. at 1054.




HASTINGS COMM/ENT LJ. [VOL. 19:225
BLOOD MONEY
As we have observed, books are goods. As such Ellie's is held to
have impliedly warranted the tangible, physical properties; i.e.,
printing and binding of books. But, at this point it becomes
necessary to distinguish between the tangible properties of these
goods and the thoughts and ideas conveyed thereby . . . . It is
unthinkable that standards imposed on the quality of goods sold by
a merchant would require that merchant, who is a book seller, to
evaluate the thought processes of the many authors and publishers
of the hundreds and often thousands of books which the merchant
offers for sale. One can readily imagine the extent of potential
litigation. Is the newsdealer, or for that matter the neighborhood
news carrier, liable if the local paper's recipes call for inedible
ingredients? We think not.
194
An analogous principle is that distributors cannot be held liable
for libel.195 Further, libel law prohibits imposing liability without fault,
whereas liability for breach of an implied warranty may occur without
fault.1" The theme running through libel law, the Cardozo court said,
is this: "[I]deas hold a privileged position in our society. They are not
equivalent to commercial products."'
197
194. Id. at 1056. Jonathan B. Mintz argues for strict liability. See Jonathan B. Mintz, Strict
Liability for Commercial Intellect, 41 CATH. U.L. REv. 617 (1992). As he says:
Courts have almost uniformly refused to classify written words or an idea as a
"product" for purposes of imposing the various form of products liability. By creating
artificial distinctions between the intellectual or intangible component of a product,
such as a recipe in a cookbook ... , and the product's tangible characteristics, courts
have often left plaintiffs without any redress, whether the claims sounded in negligence,
warranty, or strict liability.
Id. at 617. Mintz calls "unprincipled" the distinction which says publishers should face liability for
paper cuts from a cookbook but not for the consumption of one of the ingredients in one of its
recipes. Id. at 618. Therefore, Mintz proposes the creation of a "commercial intellect products
liability doctrine" to permit courts to impose strict liability "where the intellectual aspects of a
product introduced into the stream of commerce proximately cause physical injury." Id. at 619.
But he does admit that a publisher's "duty to investigate" would be "the most troubling First
Amendment incursion of commercial intellect products liability." Id. at 638.
Mintz does manage to give entertaining examples of what would constitute a product. For
instance, he talks of Derek Humphrey's book, Final Exit (1991), as being a product when it
provides "detailed instructions" on how to commit suicide. (Could a surviving plaintiff really sue
because he or she did not die?) Mintz also discusses Tracy Cabot's Book, How to Make a Man
Fall in Love with You: The Fail Proof, Fool Proof Method (1984): "If the book merely gives
advice and suggestions (e.g., 'talk about sports and wear lots of makeup'), rather than a blueprint,
it would most likely not be categorized as a product by a court." Id. at 646. A science textbook
which proposes experiments, however, would be considered a product. Id. at 646. See also Strict
Liability for the Dissemination of Dangerous Information? 82 L. LIaR. J. 497 (1990).
195. Cardozo, 342 So. 2d at 1056.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1057.
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6. The Publisher of a Metalsmith Book Prevailed Because it Owed No Duty to
Warn
"Failure to warn" also failed as a cause of action in a 1987
Michigan case, Lewin v. McCreight.19 The plaintiffs had concocted a
mordant by following instructions in The Complete Metalsmith.'9 The
mordant exploded. ° The plaintiffs said the defendant failed to warn
of "defective ideas" in the book. The court, however, ruled that to
prevail on a theory of failure to warn, the plaintiffs would first have to
show that the defendant had a duty to warn.' In this case, the court
reasoned that "the defendant publisher merely printed and bound a
book, the contents of which were written by a third-party author."'
The Michigan court then adopted the rule of the Illinois Appellate
Court in a 1985 case, Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. 20 The Alm
rule is that publishers have no duty to warn because the "burden" of
scrutinizing information supplied by third-party authors would be too
burdensome and the number of potential plaintiffs too great. 2
This Court agrees with the court in Aim that given the tremendous
burden such a duty would place upon defendant publishers, the
weighty societal interest in free access to ideas, and potentially
unlimited liability, it would be unwise to impose a duty to warn of
"defective ideas" upon publishers of information supplied by third
party authors.M
7. The Publisher of a Tool-Making Book Prevailed Because it Owed No Duty
to Warn
The Aim case involved another "how to" book, The Making of
Tools. ' A tool shattered and injured a man while he was following
the book's instructions. The man sued, claiming the publisher had a
duty to provide both adequate instructions and warnings of the
198. 655 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
199. Id. at 282.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 283.
202. Id.
203. ld.
204. 480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
205. Lewin, 655 F. Supp. at 283-84.
206. Id. at 284. The opinion continued, "Because the Court decides this case on the basis of
state tort law, it does not reach the issue of whether the imposition of a duty to warn upon
publishers of 'How To' books would pass muster under the first amendment." Id.
207. Aim, 480 N.E.2d at 1264.
208. Id.
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dangers of toolmaking. He urged the court to adopt section 311 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes a duty to provide
adequate instructions.n The court cited Prosser on the importance of
recognizing that imposing a duty constitutes "judicial policy-
making."'21 Foreseeability is insufficient for liability, the court
stressed, because almost every harm seems "foreseeable" in
retrospect. Instead, the Alm court said, courts should consider the
likelihood that injury will occur, the difficulty of guarding against
injury, and the consequences of burdening the defendant with
liability.2 '
8. A Newspaper That Published a Dandruff Remedy Prevailed Over
"Negligent Misrepresentation" Charges
Considerations similar to those in Alm resulted in rejection of
liability for a newspaper in an earlier case, MacKown v. Illinois
Publishing & Printing Co.2' In that case, a reader had been injured by
using a dandruff remedy published by the newspaper. The article said
the "formula," which included mercury, should be filled by a
pharmacist and that it was "reliable" and "scientific" because it came
from a "reputable physician."2 3 As a matter of policy, the MacKown
209. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 311 (1965), reads:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such
information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third person as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
For a general article on "reliance," see Daniel McNeel Lane, Jr., Note, Publisher Liability
for Material that Invites Reliance, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1155 (1988). For other general articles on
negligence, see, for example, Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1321 (1992); Alan Stephens, First Amendment Guaranty of Freedom of Speech or Press as
Defense to Liability Stemming from Speech Allegedly Causing Bodily Injury, 94 A.L.R. FED. 26
(1991); Gerald R. Smith, Note, Media Liability for Physical Injury Resulting from the Negligent
Use of Words, 82 L. LIBR. J. 497 (1990).
210. Alm, 480 N.E.2d at 1264-65 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 325-26 (4th ed.
1971)).
211. Alm, 480 N.E.2d at 1265.
212. 6 N.E.2d 526 (Il1. App. Ct. 1937).
213. Id. at 527. Commenting on the MacKown case, one commentator observes:
If a manufacturer sells a hair tonic injurious to humans, an injured consumer has a
potential cause of action. If a publisher publishes the formula for that same hair tonic,
an injured reader has no means of legal redress. What justifies this apparent anomaly?
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court held that the newspaper owed no duty to the reader.214 In
adopting the MacKown ruling and rejecting what it called "negligent
misrepresentation," the Aim court said that recognizing negligent
misrepresentation would impose upon publishers a duty to test every
procedure contained in their publications.2u
The Aim case, unlike Lewin, addresses First Amendment issues.
The court explained in Alm:
Plaintiff argues that the first amendment should not shield
defendant from liability, and attempts to distinguish bad advice in a
"How To" book from "a treatise on politics, religion, philosophy,
interpersonal relationships, or the like." We suspect that such a
distinction would lead to further first amendment problems
involving content-based discrimination. More important for our
purposes, however, is the chilling effect which liability would have
upon publishers, an effect recognized in the cases and not denied by
plaintiff. Even if liability could be imposed consistently with the
Constitution, we believe that the adverse effect of such liability upon
the public's free access to ideas would be too high a price to pay.
The notion that ideas hold a 'preferred position' in our society is an inevitable response
to that question. But that answer only begs the question.
Powell, supra note 170, at 503 (footnotes and citations omitted).
214. MacKown, 6 N.E.2d at 530.
215. 480 N.E.2d at 1267.
216. Id. at 1267 (citation omitted). In 1981, Barbara Libertelli sued the manufacturer of
Valium and the publisher of Physicians Desk Reference (PDR). She sued PDR's publisher for
"gross negligence" because of failure to warn that Valium is addictive. The publisher published
information about Valium that the manufacturer provided without independently testing Valium.
See Libertelli v. Hoffman-La Rouche, Inc., No. 80 Civ. 5626, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1981). In
granting the publisher's motion to dismiss the case, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York said that the First Amendment prohibited Libertelli's claim
regardless of whether the PDR. piece on Valium were characterized as an advertisement or an
informational article because the same standard applied.
The Libertelli court used the "actual malice" standard of the libel and false light cases of
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Time, Inc. v. Hil4 385 U.S. 374 (1976),
saying that "a publisher is not liable for false reports of matters of public interest absent
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth." The court then commented that
"[i]nformation about medical matters is sufficiently important to the public interest to warrant
application of that standard here." Libertelli did not allege that the publisher either knew of
Valium's addictive character or published with reckless disregard of the truth. Libertelli, slip op.
Note that in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court rejected the view that the
First Amendment required private plaintiffs caught up in matters of public interest to prove
actual malice; instead, states would set the standards for private individuals, so long as the states
required "fault." Id. at 345-46.
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9. A Publisher of an Encyclopedia on Chemicals Likewise Prevailed Over
"Misrepresentation" Charges
Like the court in Lewin, a New York court rejected
"misrepresentation" as a theory of liability. The 1977 case of Demuth
Development Corp. v. Merck & Co., Inc.,217 involved the publisher of
an encyclopedia of chemicals. The encyclopedia apparently
misrepresented the toxicity of a chemical, triethylene glycol, that the
plaintiff used in its air sterilization appliance, the Demuth Glycol
Vaporizer.218 Hospitals used the vaporizer.219 The listing for
"triethylene glycol" read, "Human Toxicity: See Ethylene Glycol."
The "ethylene glycol" listing called it a "hazard" and listed a host of
horrors which the chemical could cause. But triethylene glycol is
apparently totally non-toxic if inhaled as a vapor. Nonetheless, many
of the plaintiff's customers used the encyclopedia, considering it a
reliable authority, and stopped using the vaporizers.' A later edition
of the encyclopedia made clear that triethylene glycol could be used in
"air disinfection."" The court concluded that Merck did not owe "any
duty" to the plaintiff concerning the information about triethylene
glycol.t The court pointed to the First Amendment:
Plaintiff ... could not claim it relied to its detriment on
misinformation published by Merck. Nor does plaintiff point to any
"relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise,"
which "in morals or good conscience" placed Merck under any duty
towards plaintiff or its business. On the contrary, Merck's right to
publish free of fear of liability is guaranteed by the First
Amendment and the overriding societal interest in the untrammeled
dissemination of knowledge. The right is circumscribed only by laws
such as those respecting national secrets, copyright, obscenity,
defamation and unfair competition. The court has already held that
no claim for defamation is stated and plaintiff does not rely on any
grounds other than negligence and willful misrepresentation.2
3
217. 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
218. Id. at 991.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 992.
221. Id. at 992 n.2.
222. Id. at 992-93.
223. Id. at 993 (internal citation omitted). The court also pointed to Prosser:
As one noted commentator points out, where misstatements are claimed to be the
cause of loss, even a "reasonable anticipation that the statement will be communicated
to others whose identity is unknown to 'the defendant, or even knowledge that the
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Merck's position was bolstered by the fact that it had been publishing
its misinformation about triethylene glycol for 14 years before the
plaintiff complained.224
10. A Movie Producer Prevailed Over "Failure to Protect" Charges
Negligence theory also includes "failure to protect," which proved
unsuccessful in the 1982 case of Bill v. Superior Court of the City and
County of San Francisco.- In Bill, the mother of a girl who was shot
outside a movie theater in California sued the movie's producer on
behalf of her daughter, arguing that the film Boulevard Nights
attracted persons who were "predisposed to violence."'  Because the
defendants knew the film would attract such persons, the plaintiff's
argument continued, the defendants had a "duty to warn and/or
provide protection."' But the court reasoned that "activity in
producing a motion picture and arranging for its distribution, is
socially unobjectionable-and in light of First Amendment
considerations, must be deemed so even if it had the tendency to
attract violence-prone individuals to the vicinity of theaters at which it
was exhibited."' In a similar case, a woman injured by a blow to the
nose at an Aerosmith concert unsuccessfully sued the musicians and
the concert's organizers.m9
B. Courts Generally Find Liability in Those Cases Where Injury Results
From an Endorsed Product or Sponsored Event
In the 1969 case of Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.,m the plaintiff,
Zayda Hanberry, won because a product advertised in Good
Housekeeping Magazine carried the "Good Houskeeping's
Consumers' Guaranty Seal.""1 The seal on the purchased shoes bore
the promise that "If the product or performance is defective, Good
recipient intends to make some commercial use of it in dealing with unspecified third
parties, is not sufficient to create a duty of care towards them.
Id. (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 708 (4th ed. 1971)).
224. Id. at 994.
225. 187 Cal. Rptr. 625,626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
226. Id. at 628.
227. Id..
228. Id. at 631.
229. Matarazzo v. Aerosmith Prod., Inc., No. 86 Civ. 8815 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 16, 1989). For
more on suits against musicians, see infra notes 310-355 and accompanying text.
230. 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
231. Id. at 521.
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Housekeeping guarantees replacement or refund to consumer."
'
Further, the magazine said, "We satisfy ourselves that products
advertised in Good Housekeeping are good ones and that the
advertising claims made for them in our magazine are truthful."' Not
only did the seal of endorsement appear in Good Housekeeping, but
Hearst also allowed products bearing the seal to state that fact in ads
in other publications and allowed the seal to be attached to those
products.31 The Good Housekeeping seal, in effect, sealed the
publisher's fate when, while wearing the endorsed shoes, Hanberry
slipped on her kitchen floor. She then sued the Hearst Corporation,
among others.m
The California appellate court allowed Hanberry to sue on the
theory of "negligent misrepresentation," stating:
The basic question presented on this appeal is whether one who
endorses a product for his [or her] own economic gain, and for the
purpose of encouraging and inducing the public to buy it, may be
liable to a purchaser who, relying on the endorsement, buys the
product and is injured because it is defective and not as represented
in the endorsement. We conclude such liability may exist and a
cause of action has been pleaded in the instant case 3 6
1. A Radio Broadcaster's Co-Sponsorship of Cheap Drinks at a Bar Led to
Liability for a Drunken-Driving Accident
According to a 1994 case, a radio broadcaster's co-sponsorship of
"Ladies Night" at a bar is, in terms of liability, an equivalent to a
magazine's endorsement of an ad. The case of Riley v. Triplex
Communications, Inc.,' began when when two police officers, the
plaintiffs, were struck by a drunk in a rather bizarre chain of events.
On Thursday nights, the Cowboy Palace bar and Radio Station
KZZB-95 FM in Beaumont, Texas, sponsored "B-95 Ladies' Night at
the Palace," when drinks were only 95 cents each and women paid no
cover charge.m One Thursday night, an underaged drinker, who had
consumed approximately ten drinks, had an accident on his way home.
The officers were directing traffic around the accident when another
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 522.
235. Id. at 521.
236. Id. The court cited Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 311. Id. at 523 n.1. For the
text of section 311, see supra note 209.
237. 874 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. App. 1994).
238. Id. at 335-36.
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drunk, who had consumed sixteen or seventeen rum-and-cokes and
was speeding home from the Palace, struck the officers with his car.
The officers sued both the Palace and the radio station.m The trial
jury awarded one officer $1,300,139.57 and the other $91,714.85, ruling
against the Palace on the dram shop theory of liability. ° But the
judge refused to let the jury decide the questions of whether the
Palace and the radio station were a "joint enterprise" and whether the
radio station engaged in "negligent promotion."'
The appeals court noted that the radio station approached the
Palace with the idea of a B-95 night. 2 Promotions included giving
away free t-shirts and beer mugs advertising both the radio station and
the Palace as well as giving away cars during a B-95 night. 3 The radio
station broadcast live from the Palace on B-95 nights and the president
of KZZB-95 acknowledged that the live broadcast could easily lead
listeners to believe a B-95 event was under way.' The appeals court
concluded that "[i]t would be difficult to conjure a more appropriate
factual scenario to which the legal concept . . . of joint enterprise
would apply." 5 In fact, the court said, "In advertising or promoting,
seldom is seen such co-mingling, intertwining and common pursuit of
purpose."
6
The court characterized the advertising as negligent promotion
because the perception of B-95 night was that it was a "party" with B-
95 as the host. 7 The radio station's "promotional activities" were
geared to induce patrons "to purchase and consume as many alcoholic
beverages as time would permit" whether they were old enough to
legally drink or not.' The court adopted the view that it would
consider several factors, including "risk, foreseeability, and likelihood
of injury," and weigh them against "the social utility of the actor's
conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury,
239. Id. at 335.
240. Id. at 335-36.
241. Id.
242. Id. 336.
243. Id. at 336-37.
244. Id. at 338-39.
245. Id. at 346.
246. Id. at 349.
247. Id. at 339.
24& Id. at 350. The court case includes transcriptions of several B-95 promotions. Id. at 338-
39.
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and consequences of placing the burden on the defendant." 9
Foreseeability, however, was the court's "foremost and dominant
consideration."' The court concluded that it was reasonably
foreseeable that patrons would respond to the promotional
bombardment, drink irresponsibly, leave the Palace in a car, and have
an accident.51 To determine whether the risks were reasonable, the
court weighed them against the social utility of the radio station's
conduct by asking a rhetorical question: "Does there exist any
redeemable social utility in advertisement which encourages
irresponsible drinking via inexpensive alcoholic beverages whether
those persons are of legal age or not?" As precedent for ruling
against the radio station, the court cited Braun v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine.53 The court remanded the case, saying that the trial court
erred in refusing to let the jury decide the questions of joint enterprise
and negligent promotion.25
2. A Radio Broadcaster's Sponsorship of a Contest Requiring Speed on the
Road Led to Liability for a Driving Accident
A rock station's sponsorship of a dangerous activity also resulted
in a plaintiff's victory in the 1975 case of Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc.255 Radio station KHJ in Los Angeles, which at the time had 48
percent of the teenage audience in the Los Angeles area, offered a
reward to the first listener to locate a disk jockey in a "conspicuous"
red car and answer a question he posed. The disc jockey kept
listeners apprised of his route. While two minors in separate cars
pursued the disc jockey, one of the pursuers ran another motorist off
the road, killing him. The dead man's wife and children sued the
station.? The court asked whether the radio station had owed the
249. Id. at 350.
250. Id. at 350 (quoting Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.
1990)). For a nearly verbatim recitation of the same requirements, see Way v. Boy Scouts of
America, 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1993), discussed supra notes 130-135 and accompanying
text.
251. Riley, 874 S.W. 2d at 350.
25Z Id. at 351.
253. Id. For its similarity and reasoning, the court also cited Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.,
539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975). For a full discussion of Weirum, see infra notes 255-262 and
accompanying text.
254. Riley v. Triplex Communications, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 333, 353 (Tex. App. 1994).
255. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
256. Id. at 37-38.
257. Id. at 38-39.
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victim "a duty of due care."'' 8 The court said that "foreseeability of
the risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of
duty." ' 9 The court concluded that evidence of foreseeability was
ample and that "[i]t is of no consequence that the harm . . . was
inflicted by third parties acting negligently." The court also rejected
the defendant's argument that the contest received First Amendment
protection, saying, "The issue here is civil accountability for the
foreseeable results of a broadcast which created an undue risk of
harm . . . . The First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of
physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than act."'
Echoing the rhetorical question asked in Riley of whether the
social utility of the radio station's activities outweighs the risks of
drunk driving, the court in Weirum asked whether the social utility
outweighed the risks caused by high-speed automobile chases. After
weighing the factors, the court decided that "neither the entertainment
afforded by the contest nor its commercial rewards can justify the
creation of such a grave risk."'
V
Incitement
A. The Brandenburg Incitement Theory
Negligence and strict liability are not the only theories used
against the media to find liability for the infliction of bodily harm or
death on others. Plaintiffs also have employed the incitement theory
found in Brandenburg v. Ohio.' In this 1969 case, a Ku Klux Klan
leader was convicted of violating a state statute prohibiting advocacy
of "the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial
258. Id. at 39.
259. Id. at 39 (citation omitted). The court also said, "It is true, of course, that virtually every
act involves some conceivable danger. Liability is imposed only if the risk of harm resulting from
the act is deemed unreasonable-i.e., if the gravity and likelihood of the danger outweigh the
utility of the conduct involved." Id. at 40 (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 146-49 (4th ed.
1971)).
260. Weirum, 539 P.2d at 40 (citation omitted).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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or political reform." The Court enunciated the test to be used in
determining whether advocacy language could be proscribed:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless actions and is likely to incite or produce
such action.
6
This test can be viewed as having two parts, with a subjective
requirement that advocacy be "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless actions" and an objective requirement that the
advocacy be "likely to incite or produce such action." Or the
Brandenburg test can be viewed as having three parts, requiring (1)
intent, (2) imminence, and (3) likelihood. Either way, the
"incitement" standard under Brandenburg is an extremely difficult
one to satisfy. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit observed, "without actual incitement, First Amendment
considerations 'argue against . . . liability . ... "
As the following cases demonstrate, courts have emphatically
rejected liability in bodily injury cases in which plaintiffs have
attempted to invoke "incitement."'267
264. Id. at 444-45. The proscription of "unlawful methods of terrorism" of course raises the
question of whether there are lawful methods of terrorism.
265. Id. at 447.
266. Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 1990)(citations omitted). Although
philosopher John Stuart Mill was a staunch supporter of everyone's right to express an opinion,
he wrote in his famous work On Liberty: "[E]ven opinions lose immunity, when the
circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute . . . a positive instigation to
some mischievous act." He then gives an example of what he means by an opinion which is "a
positive instigation to some mischievous act": "An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the
poor . . . ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur
punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-
dealer. ... JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, PART III, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART
MILL 304 (Max Lerner ed., 1961).
Whipping up an excited mob led to a conviction for "inciting to riot" in New York v. Tolia,
631 N.Y.S.2d 632,633-34. (1995). Police were about to shut off the power to a band playing at the
end of a four-day "Resist to Exist Concert" in Manhattan when the defendant told the crowd to
"Resist." They did, surging forward to the stage and injuring police. Id. at 633-34. Clearly his
speech "was calculated to incite and produce imminent lawless action," the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York ruled. Id. at 637.
267. For an interesting article that explores incitement cases decided through early 1987, see
Juliet Lushbough Dee, Media Accountability for Real-Life Violence: A Case of Negligence or Free
Speech?, 37 J. OF COMM. 106 (Spring 1987). In summarizing her article, Dee says, "A review of the
U.S. court decisions on cases in which a child or young adult was the victim of violence that was
said to have been induced by the media-from films to television to rock music-suggests that
the courts have in general hesitated to hold media organizations accountable for inciting the
violent acts of individuals." See also David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech,
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B. Modern Incitement Case Law
1. A Magazine Publisher Prevailed
A fourteen-year-old boy tried an experiment-" autoerotic
asphyxia"-as discussed in Hustler magazine in an article entitled
Orgasm of Death. He died. A copy of Hustler, opened to the article,
lay on the closet floor where his nude body hung. His parents sued
but lost in the 1987 case of Herceg v. Hustler Magazine.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
described autoerotic asphyxia as "masturbation while 'hanging'
oneself in order to temporarily cut off the blood supply to the brain at
the moment of orgasm." 9 The Hustler article described how to
perform the maneuver and the pleasure one might receive, but
warned: "Hustler emphasizes the often-fatal dangers of the practice of
'auto-erotic asphyxia,' and recommends that readers seeking unique
forms of sexual release DO NOT ATTEMPT this method. The facts
are presented here solely for an educational purpose." The court
rejected the argument that the article constituted an "incitement to
attempt a potentially fatal act," holding that imposing liability would
impermissibly infringe on Hustler's freedom of speech. 1 In the court's
words, "Even if the article paints in glowing terms the pleasures
supposedly achieved by the practice it describes . ..no fair reading
of it can make its content advocacy, let alone incitement to engage in
the practice."'
2. A Book Publisher Prevailed
The incitement theory also failed in a 1979 Pennsylvania case,
Smith v. Linn.273 A woman died of cardiac arrest after losing more
than 100 pounds while following a liquid protein diet from When
Everything Else Fails . . . The Last Chance Diet.274 The administrator
of her estate sued the publisher, alleging that the woman's death was
Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REv. 1 (1994); Ilene
R. Penn, Right or Privilege: Indecent, Inciteful and Hateful Speech? 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 126
(1993).
268. 814 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (5th Cir. 1987).
269. Id. at 1018.
270. Id. at 1018-19 (Part 1).
271. ld. at 1021.
272. Id. at 1022-23.
273. 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. 1989).
274. Id. at 123.
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caused by her adherence to the dietP5 The plaintiff argued that the
book should not be granted First Amendment protection because it
was an "incitement to immediate unreflecting action such as the action
arising from shouting 'Fire' in a crowded theater."276 In short,
according to the court, the plaintiff wanted the court to be the first to
find a publisher liable for negligent publication of a book.' The court
declined to do so, even though it was "moved by the grievous
circumstances."'
3. The Manufacturer of the Parlor Game "Dungeons & Dragons" Prevailed
Claiming that "Dungeons & Dragons" so obsessed her son that he
committed suicide, a mother sued for wrongful death but lost in the
1991 Watters v. TSR, Inc.' case. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit rejected the incitement theory, concluding that
the boy's "death surely was not the fault of his mother, or his school,
or his friends, or the manufacturer of the game he and his friends so
loved to play. Tragedies such as this simply defy rational explanation,
and courts should not pretend otherwise."'
275. Id. at 124-25.
276. Id. at 125.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 127. The court said,
[W]ithout scrupulous protection of the first amendment right by the courts,
governments can oppress the people and in effect rewrite history when the people are
suppressed in their expressions, as witnessed by recent events in China. Although we
are moved by the grievous circumstances surrounding the instant case, we will not
disturb the proper ruling of the trial court in granting summary judgment on the basis
of the first amendment right of the publisher.
Id.
279. 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1991).
280. Id. at 384. The court also rejected a negligence theory, saying that the contents of the
game would not have given its manufacturer "reason to foresee that players of the game would
become more susceptible to murder or suicide than non-players." Id. at 382.
In another "Dungeons & Dragons" case, Caleb Fairley, who allegedly liked to live in a
"fantasy world" and play the "kingpin" from the game, was convicted of murdering a woman and
her daughter. Frank Devil, Fairley Gets Two Life Terms, No Parole, MORNING CALL (Allentown),
July 25, 1996, at Al. No suit has been filed against the manufacturers of "Dungeons & Dragons"
in these deaths.
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C. Television Programming Has Resulted in Unsuccessful Suits
1. Television Broadcasters Prevailed
In the 1971 case of Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
ruled against a teenage boy and his parents who claimed that the
youth had become "involuntarily addicted" to and "completely
subliminally intoxicated" by television?8 The plaintiffs alleged that
extensive viewing of television led the teenager to shoot and kill his
83-year-old neighbor.' The plaintiffs sued CBS, ABC, and NBC,
claiming the networks breached "their duty to plaintiffs by failing to
use ordinary care to prevent Ronny Zamora from being
'impermissibly stimulated, incited and instigated' to duplicate the
atrocities he viewed on television."'  The judge said that "[r]eference
to the 'incitement' cases . . . should not obscure the obvious."' 5 The
"obvious" was that the plaintiff should lose on First Amendment
grounds, and the judge dismissed it with prejudice.' He also
commented:
At the risk of overdeveloping the apparent, I suggest that the
liability sought for by plaintiffs would place broadcasters in jeopardy
for televising Hamlet, Julius Caesar, Grimm's Fairy Tales; more
contemporary offerings such as All Quiet On the Western Front, and
even The Holocaust, and indeed would render John Wayne a risk
not acceptable to any but the boldest broadcasters. 
2 7
281. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
282. Id. at 200.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 206.
286. Id. at 206-07.
287. Id. at 206. Two commentators argue the other side. For an article contending that
Congress or the Federal Communications Commission should "restrict the airing of
programming containing elements proven to be highly likely to cause imitative and harmful
responses by viewers," see E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. & Lisa A. Hook, The Control of Media
Related Imitative Violence, 38 FED. Comm. L.J. 317, 318 (1987). They argue, perhaps
unconvincingly to First Amendment aficionados, that:
When someone watches a brutal act on a movie or television screen and promptly
carries out a similar act, hurting himself or others, our common sense tells us there
must be a "but for" relationship between what this person saw and what he did. If there
is, does it not follow that there must be a remedy against those who "made" him do
what he otherwise would not have done?
Id. Of course, the rub is in who "made" the person do it.
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2. A Television Station Prevailed
In 1982, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island also found the First
Amendment barred suit against a television station that broadcast a
"Johnny Carson Show" featuring a stuntman who "hanged" Carson.m
After the show ended, a mother found her son dead, a noose around
his neck.2 9 The ensuing suit, DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting
Co.,290 failed to convince the court that the broadcasters were
negligentm or that the "Johnny Carson Show" segment was an
"incitement to immediately harmful conduct."'
3. Walt Disney Productions Prevailed
Likewise, in the 1981 case of Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v.
Shannon,' the First Amendment was held to bar a suit brought on
behalf of a child who watched the "Mickey Mouse Club" and then
partially blinded himself.' The show contained a feature about sound
effects, including how to put a BB pellet inside a balloon and then roll
the pellet around to sound as if a tire were coming off a car. The child
instead put a large piece of lead in the balloon, which burst and
propelled the lead into his eye.' The Georgia Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that "statements made during the
course of the program constituted an invitation, accepted by the
plaintiff, to do something posing a foreseeable risk of injury to
children of tender years."'  However, the court did say that it could
"envision" cases where an individual could be found liable "solely on
the ground" that statements did constitute such an invitation.
27
D. TV Ads Have Resulted in Unsuccessful Suits
Pepsico was not held liable for the injuries done when a youngster
imitated a stunt featured in one of its Mountain Dew commercials. In
288. DeFilippo v. National Broad. Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1037-38 (R.I. 1982).
289. Id. at 1038.
290. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
291. Id. at 1040.
292 Id. at 1040-42.
293. 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981). For commentary on the DeFilippo and Walt Disney
Production cases, see Steven J. Weingarten, Note, Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Negligent
Statements: First Amendment Consideration, 93 YALE L.J. 744 (1984).





the 1989 case of Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc.,2 the Florida Supreme Court
said Pepsico did not encourage viewers to undertake "Lake
Jumping"-riding a bicycle up a ramp and landing in water.29 Sakon,
a 14-year-old boy, rode up a ramp and landed head-first in a creek that
was only three feet deep, breaking his neck.' In ruling against
liability, the court said that all Pepsico did was "portray young people
engaged in a sporting activity which can be dangerous if not done by
skilled persons under proper conditions."' Liability could only be
established, the court continued, if Pepsico's actions were the
proximate cause of Sakon's injuries-"that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."' But in this case, the court rejected the notion that the
accident was a "foreseeable consequence."'  It also rejected the claim
that the commercial should have included a warning. The court asked:
What warning would really suffice in order to avoid liability? For
instance, should it specify the depth of the water? If too shallow, the
actor might strike the bottom. If too deep, he might drown. Must the
actor be warned he must be able to swim? Must he be warned how
to prevent the bicycle from injuring him? The court should not
undertake to identify or set the standards to be followed by
commercials of this nature.
3°4
298. 553 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1989). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
certified the question: "Whether the law of the State of Florida recognizes a duty owed by a
television advertiser to its targeted audience of young viewers when that advertiser has
broadcast, without adequate warnings, a commercial depicting a dangerous activity in a manner
likely to induce a young viewer to imitate the activity." Id. at 164.
299. Id. at 166.
300. Id. at 164.
301. Id. at 166.
302. Id. at 166-67 (citation omitted). For an enlightening general article on proximate
causation, see David A. Fischer, Products Liability-Proximate Cause, Intervening Cause, and
Duty, 52 Mo. L. REV. 547 (1987).
303. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 166.
304. Id. at 167. The court continued:
The foreseeability of plaintiff's action was no more real than would be the
foreseeability that persons attending the circus would undertake performance of acts
done by the entertainers, whether on high wires, playing with animals or swallowing a
sword. Should the operator of a ski area, when advertising and showing persons skiing,
be required to warn viewers or readers they need to take lessons before trying to ski?
Should advertisement of water ski areas warn that water skiing is dangerous, and that
one should not attempt to ski over a ramp? To be sure, there is danger of injury in
these sports by one inexperienced, but does the failure to warn in the advertisement
constitute a breach of duty to one who observes it?
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E. Movie Producers Have Also Been Unsuccessfully Sued for Incitement
In 1981, a California suit, Olivia N. v. NBC,5 stemmed from a
copy-cat sexual assault. The film Born Innocent included a scene
where an adolescent girl was sexually assaulted in a shower by four
other girls using a "plumber's helper." After seeing and discussing the
film, young assailants "artificially raped" a 9-year-old victim on a
beach with a bottle.3 After an earlier attempt to show incitement,3
the plaintiff conceded an inability to prove "incitement as defined in
Brandenburg v. Ohio," but claimed that negligence liability could still
be imposed.' The California Court of Appeals concluded that
"[i]mposing liability on a simple negligence theory here would
frustrate vital freedom of speech guarantees" and dismissed the
case.3W9
F. Rock Stars and Their Record Companies Have Prevailed in Suits
Claiming That Their Music Led to Suicides
1. Development of Case Law
In the 1991 case of Waller v. Osbourne,310 parents whose son
committed suicide in Georgia sued rock star Ozzy Osbourne and his
record company, saying the youth shot himself after listening
repeatedly to the song "Suicide Solution." Lyrics included:
Ah know people
You really know where it's at
You got it
Why, why
Get the gun and try it
Shoot, shoot, shoot.
311
305. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
306. Id. at 890-91. For commentary on this case and tort liability of film producers in general,
see Laura W. Brill, The First Amendment and the Power of Suggestion: Protecting 'Negligent'
Speakers in Cases of Imitative Harm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 984 (1994).
307. See Olivia N. v. NBC, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
308. Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
309. ,Id. at 894. For a chilling account of a serial killer who says that the movie RoboCop was
a factor in his crimes, see Steve Garbarino, Imitators Under the Influence of Art, NEWSDAY, Aug.
10, 1992, at 38 (Part II of series of articles entitled Do Movies Trigger Violent Acts?).
310. 763 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Ga. 1991), affd, 958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
916 (1992).
311. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. at 1145-46. Plaintiffs also contended, but could not prove, that
"Suicide Solution" contained subliminal messages. Id. at 1146-50.
1997]
The parents sought $9 million in damages.3m They contended that
the music "incites imminent lawless action" and thus should be
stripped of First Amendment protection. Employing the Brandenburg
v. Ohio test, the trial court made clear the music would lose its First
Amendment protection only if the court found the music was
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action. ' 313 The court concluded that the
music did not constitute "culpable incitement." '314 While extending its
sympathy to the grieving parents, the court extended full First
Amendment protection to the music.315 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision,316
and in 1992 the Supreme Court denied certiorari.317
Ozzy Osbourne likewise prevailed in an earlier suit, McCollum v.
CBS,318 brought in 1988 by parents of another child who had
committed suicide after listening to Osbourne's "Suicide Solution."
This case provides another example where the plaintiff's argument of
"culpable incitement" based on the Brandenburg test failed and the
First Amendment prevailed. 9 In 1990, a judge in Nevada dismissed a
similar suit against rock star Judas Priest for a 1985 suicide allegedly
prompted by the album "Stained Class."
Fewer than two years after the ruling in the Judas Priest case, a
death occurred that precipitated another foray into the tangled judicial
312. Russell Shaw, "Suicide" Suit Dismissed; Judge: Osbourne Song Not Culpable,
BILLBOARD, May 18, 1991, at 8.
313. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. at 1150 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969)).
314. Id. at 1151.
315. Id. at 1152-53.
316. Waller v. Osbourne, 958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1992).
317. Waller v. Osboume, 506 U.S. 916 (1992).
318. 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
319. Id. at 193.
320. See Shaw, supra note 312. See also Peter D. Csathy, Takin' the Rap: Should Artists Be
Held Accountable for the Violent Recorded Speech?, 10 COMM. LAW. 7 (1992). The grisly
circumstances that led to the filing of the suit also led to the making of a successful documentary,
Dream Deceivers. The documentary tells about the lives of two "head-banger" friends who
listened to Priest while getting drunk and then took a shotgun with them to a nearby park. One
of the friends committed suicide; the other blew away the lower half of his face. See Noel
Holston, Powerful Film on 'P.O. V.' is a Study in Denial, STAR TRIB., Aug. 8, 1992, at 1E. See also
Janet Maslin, Review/Film; Teen-Age Suicide, Rock and Parental Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1992, at C15; John Koch, Suicide: Did Judas Priest Make Them Try It?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3,
1992, at 30; Rick Kogan, Artistic Isolation; 'Deceivers' Explores Heavy Metal, Teen Suicide, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 3, 1992, at 5; Walter Goodman, Review; Television; Heavy Metal as a Seducer Unto
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at C18.
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thicket. Again the question was whether songs of death can be
responsible for violent death. The fatal shooting of a trooper resulted
in both a murder conviction of a youth and the filing of a suit against
the late rapper Tupac Shakur, his record company, and its parent
company.
2. Did Tupac Shakur's Music Lead to the Murder of a Policeman?
A civil suit is pending, brought by widow Linda Davidson, whose
husband, Bill, a 43-year-old trooper and father of two, was shot to
death on April 11, 1992. Mr. Davidson had stopped an 18-year-old
motorist who was speeding down a Texas highway near Aurora in a
stolen Chevrolet Blazer blaring rap music. The trooper stopped him
because of a missing headlight."
. At the time of the shooting, Howard was listening to 2pacalypse
Now by Tupac (or 2pac) Amaru Shakur, with lyrics such as, "Drop
them, or let them drop you. I choose dropping the cop."' Lyrics from
Soulja's Story include, "Cops on my tail, so I bail till I dodge them.
They finally pull me over and I laugh 'Remember Rodney King' and I
blast on his punk ass. Now I got a murder case . . . . What the fuck
would you do?"'  Another song on the tape, "Crooked Ass Nigga,"
says, in part: "I got a tech-9 now his smokin' ass is
mine . . . . Comin' quickly up the streets is the punk ass police. The
first one jumped out and said freeze. I popped him in his knees.""
Because of pretrial publicity, the venue for Howard's murder case
was changed from Jackson to Austin County.m During the trial,
Howard's lawyer, Allen Tanner, tried to prove the music influenced
Howard, describing him as a "rap addict who lived, breathed and
worshipped" the lifestyle depicted in gangsta rap. Hoping the jury
321. See, e.g., Yumi Wilson, Back Beat of Pain and Anger in Music: Death Metal, Gangsta
Rap, Grunge Rock Have a Common Theme, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 1994, at El; Chuck Philips,
Rap Defense Doesn't Stop Death Penalty: "The Music Affected Me," Says Ronald Ray Howard.
"That's How It Was that Night I Shot the Trooper," L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at Fl; Sylvia
Moreno, Stakes High in Murder by Rap Fan; Trial Questions About 1st Amendment, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 21, 1993, at 1A; Geordie Greig, American Widow Sues for "Murder Under
the Influence of Rap," SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992.
322. Can Violent Music Breed Violent Acts?, LARRY KING LIVE (CNN television broadcast,
July 7, 1993). King's guests that night included Linda Davidson, the trooper's widow.
323. Wilson, supra note 321. See also Janet Elliott, Killer's Sentence Sets Stage for Civil Case,
TEx. LAW., July 19, 1993, at 4.
324. Philips, supra note 321.
325. Janet Elliott, When PR Sits Second Chair; "Spin" Purveyors' Influence Grows at Major
Texas Trials, TEX. LAW., Aug. 2, 1993, at 1.
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would get a feel for the music enjoyed by Howard, Tanner played
"gangsta rap" for the jurors-by Shakur, Geto Boys, Ice Cube,
Ganksta N-I-P, and N.W.A. 6 Tanner played songs such as "City
Under Siege," "Money and the Power," "Trigger Happy Police," and
"Slaughter."' Howard testified that listening to Shakur's music gave
him "a fight-back attitude versus stay away.'" And District Attorney
Robert E. Bell repeatedly told the jury that he hated "gangsta rap,"
but that rap music should not be a mitigating factor.'m
The jury convicted Rodney Ray Howard of murder on June 8,
1992.33 The jury deliberated for approximately half an hour over his
guilt. 1 On July 14, 1993, the jury sentenced 19-year-old Howard to
die.3 The jurors deliberated for five days over his sentence, 33 twice
returning notes to the judge saying they were deadlocked. 3 4
Widow Linda Davidson is suing Shakur, Interscope Records, and
its parent company, Time-Warner.0 Her lawyer, James Cole of
Victoria, TexasU 6 removed the case from state court to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.3 7 The case
326. Philips, supra note 321.
327. Moreno, supra note 321.
328. Elliott, supra note 325.
329. Id. Two teenagers who killed policeman William A. Robertson in Milwaukee in
September 1994 claimed they planned the sniper attack "because of a Tupac Shakur record that
talks about killing the police." See Chuck Philips, Gangsta Rap: Did Lyrics Inspire Killing of
Police? L.A. TiMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at F2. The two were convicted of murder. See David Doege,
Walker Intended to Kill, Jury Rules, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 1995, at 1.
330. Sylvia Moreno, Man Guilty in Rap Slaying Case; Music's Influence to Be Used in
Defense Against Death Penalty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 9, 1993, at 12B.
331. On June 9, 1993, the Dallas Morning News reported that deliberation lasted for 25
minutes. On June 21, the Dallas Morning News reported that deliberation lasted for 26 minutes.
Then on July 15, the Dallas Morning News reported that deliberation lasted for 40 minutes. See
Moreno, Man Guilty in Rap Slaying Case, supra note 330; Moreno, Stakes High in Murder by
Rap Fan, supra note 321; Sylvia Moreno, Man Given Death Penalty in Rap Case; Jury Took 5
Days to Make Sentence Recommendation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 15, 1993, at 1A.
332. Moreno, Man Given Death Penalty in Rap Case, supra note 331.
333. Id. See also Elliott, When PR Sits Second Chair, supra note 325. The jury's decision was
rendered on the sixth day, resulting in some reports that deliberations lasted six days. See Philips,
Rap Defense Doesn't Stop Death Penalty, supra note 321.
334. Moreno, Man Given Death Penalty in Rap Case, supra note 331; Philips, Rap Defense
Doesn't Stop Death Penalty, supra note 321.
335. Moreno, Stakes High in Murder by Rap Fan, supra note 321; Philips, Rap Defense
Doesn't Stop Death Penalty, supra note 321.
336. Elliott, When PR Sits Second Chair, supra note 325; Elliott, Slain Trooper's Family
Seeks Damages from Rapper: Round 2 in 'Gangsta Rap' Case, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1993, at 10.
337. Telephone Interview with Tracy Thormahlen, legal assistant to James Cole (July 6,
1994).
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had been set for trial on October 23, 1995,2 but the defense moved
for summary judgment, and the case was removed from the trial
docket.' 9 On March 28, 1997, Judge John D. Rainey granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.? The judgement was
entered on March 31, and the plaintiffs have thirty days to appeal.
The "goal" in filing the $100 million suit against Time-Warner,
the plaintiff's attorney said, "is to punish Time-Warner and wake up
the executives who run the music business." He continued, "It is time
giant corporations were stopped from shameless making money off
music designed to incite impressionable young men to shoot and kill
cops."
341
The suit claims the "music contained on the tape was directed to
inciting young black males, including Ronald Howard, to kill
policemen. The incitement was directed to and resulted in imminent
action."' 2 The suit also alleges negligence and gross negligence in
producing and selling the music.3' In short, it is also a products
liability suit.34 Three theories are present in the suit: incitement,
negligence, and products liability.' Under an incitement theory,
338. Telephone Interview with Tracy Thormahlen, legal assistant to James Cole (Feb. 7,
1995).
339. Telephone Interview with Tracy Thormahlen, legal assistant to James Cole (Nov. 21,
1994).
340. Davidson v. Time-Warner, Inc., No. V-94-6, slip op. (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 1997).
341. Greig, supra note 321. For more on this case, see Chuck Philips, Testing the Limits; The
Fatal Shooting of a Texas Trooper During a Routine Traffic Stop Sets up a Conflict over the
Words in a Rap Song that May Wind Up ... Testing the Limits, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1992, at F1;
Chuck Philips, Can We Blame Rap Lyrics?: Trooper's Death Renews Debate on Song Content,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1992, at 1.
Of course, Time-Warner has also been at the center of controversy for the album "Body
Count" by Ice-T. See, e.g., Greig, supra note 321; Csathy, supra note 320; John Leland, Rap and
Race, NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1992, at 46; Rapper Ice-T Defends Song Against Spreading Boycott,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 19, 1992, at C24; David Treadwell, Ice-T Rips Efforts to Suppress his "Cop
Killer" Song, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 1992, at Fl; Chuck Philips, Police Groups Urge Halt of
Record's Sale, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1992, at Fl.
For commentary on the general subject of the effects of rap music, see Jason Talerman, The
Death of Tupac: Will Gangsta Rap Kill the First Amendment?, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 117
(1994); Carol Kirschenbaum, Is It a Bad Rap? 14 AUSTIN Bus. J., Mar. 14, 1994, at Al; Jeffrey B.
Kahan, Bach, Beethoven and the (Home) Boys: Music History as it Ought to be Taught, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 2583 (1993); Roger Catlin, Song Lyrics Reflect, Don't Cause Problems, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 6,1992, at A6.
342. Moreno, Man Given Death Penalty in Rap Case, supra note 331.
343.. Elliott, Killer's Sentence Sets Stage for Civil Case, supra note 323.
344. Elliott, When PR Sits Second Chair, supra note 325.




plaintiffs must prove intentY36 Under negligence theory, plaintiffs must
show, among other elements, foreseeability of the harm.- 7 But under
a products liability theory, a plaintiff can prevail under the doctrine of
strict liability, meaning that if the plaintiff can prove that the product
caused the harm, the producer will be liable regardless of intent or
negligence.m The suit, however, does present the anomaly of the
widow Linda Davidson's not wanting the music to be a mitigating
factor in Howard's capital murder case, but wanting the makers of the
music to be found civilly liable for the murder?49 No specific amount
of damages has been claimed in Davidson's suit.A
Tupac Shakur died in Las Vegas on Friday, September 13, 1996,
six days after taking four shots in the chest,351 after a lifetime marked
by gunfire. Shakur was charged with shooting and wounding two off-
346. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); supra notes 263-266 and accompanying
text.
347. See McCollum v. CBS, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); supra notes 318-319 and
accompanying text.
348. "Strict liability" imposes damages on the basis of "mere causation," regardless of
whether a defendant was at fault. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 547-48 (1989)(White, J.,
dissenting). Strict liability is often applied, for instance, to people who own wild animals. Under
strict liability, if a person kept a tiger that escaped and killed another animal or a child, the
person would not be asked whether he or she had been careful in caging the tiger. The only
question would be: "Is this your tiger?" If yes, the person would pay for the damage, regardless
of whether he or she had been careful. For a discussion of Florida Star, see supra notes 115-125
and accompanying text.
349. Elliott, When PR Sits Second Chair, supra note 325.
350. Telephone Interviews with Tracy Thormahlen, James Cole's legal assistant (July 6, 1994
and Mar. 21, 1996).
351. Robert Hilburn & Jerry Crow, Rapper Tupac Shakur, 25, Dies 6 Days After Ambush,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1996, at Al. Shakur's death generated extensive commentary on the
meaning of his life, his death, his music, and the rap-music industry. See, e.g., Jeff Leeds & Jim
Newton, FBI Probing Rap Label for Ties to Gangs, Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1996, at A18;
Michel Marriott, From Rap's Rhythms, a Retooling of Poetry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1996, at 1;
Cathy Maestri, Drawing Lessons from a Rapper's Death, PRESS ENTER., Sept. 29, 1996, at E3;
Dana Kennedy, Rap Wars; Did the Violence Claim Another Life?, ENT. WEEKLY, Sept. 27, 1996,
at 8; Jeff Leeds & Jim Newton, FBI Probing Rap Label for Ties to Gangs, Drugs, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1996, at B1; J.D. Considine, No Longer a War of Words, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 26, 1996, at
F3; David Van Biema, "What Goes Round . . . "; Superstar Rapper Tupac Shakur Is Gunned
Down in an Ugly Scene Straight out of His Own Lyrics, TIME, Sept. 23, 1996, at 40; Johnnie L.
Roberts, Blood on the Record Biz, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1996, at 69; Michael Eric Dyson, The
Culture Wars; Tupac: Living the Life he Rapped About in Song, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at Ml;
Chrisena Coleman & Dave Saltonstall, A Gangsta or Gangbusta? Rap World Debates Lessons of
Shakur's Death, DAILY NEWS (New York), Sept. 22, 1996, at 5; Esther Iverem, Verses of Sorrow
for Shakur; Rapper's Life Praised, Rebuked at Memorial, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at Dl.
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duty police officers in Atlanta on October 31, 1993,15 but he was not
convicted.' Shakur was also shot five times in the groin during a
robbery on November 30, 1 99 4 .31 Davidson's suit has proceeded
without him, against his estate. 55
VI
Are Increasing Physical Dangers Endangering
the First Amendment?
A. Life Imitating Art: Timothy McVeigh and The Turner Diaries
When the deadly bomb allegedly planted by Timothy McVeigh
demolished the federal building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995,1
it damaged America's psyche by forcing the realization that terrorists
can strike anywhere. Did that blast damage the foundations of the
First Amendment as well?
Evidence that Timothy McVeigh was acquainted with The Turner
Diaries seems incontrovertible. The book, written by William Pierce,
352. See, e.g., John Leland, Gangsta Rap and the Culture of Violence, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29,
1993, at 60; Kris Jensen, Are Rap Rhymes and Crimes Connected?, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Nov.
23, 1993, at D3.
353. Tony Norman, When Death Imitates Art, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZ., Sept. 10, 1996, at Bi.
354. Rapper Tupac Shakur Robbed, Shot in N.Y.; Violence Marks Singer's Lyrics and Life,
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al. The next day, a New York City jury found Shakur "guilty" of
sexually abusing a female fan. Shakur was not present for the verdict. See Shakur Found Guilty
of Sex Abuse Charge, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at A31; Wounded Rapper Convicted of Sex
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at Bi.
On February 7, 1995, Shakur received a sentence of up to four-and-a-half years. See Rapper
Gets 4 1/2 Years in Sex Case; Tupac Shakur Says He Did No Crime, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Feb.
8, 1995, at B9; NEWSDAY, Rapper Shakur Sentenced to Prison in Sexual Assault, Hous. CHRON.,
Feb. 8, 1995, at A8. He served eight months and was out on bail when he was fatally shot. See
Richard Roeper, Rapper Shakur's Music an Ode to Gang Members, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 11,
1996, at 11; Shakur Remains in ICU; No Leads Reported in Rapper's Shooting, WASH. POST, Sept.
11, 1996, at D8.
355. Telephone Interview with Tracy Thormahlen, legal assistant to James Cole (Sept. 9,
1996). Some commentators think the next target for suits may be country music. A year-long
study of 49 metropolitan areas led two sociologists to conclude that the greater the radio time
devoted to country music, the higher the suicide rates for white listeners. David Gelman, Beware
of Those Tears in Your Beers, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1992, at 90; Shirley Ragsdale, Is Suicide
Country Music's New Dance Partner?, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Dec. 22, 1992, available in 1992 WL
9657211.
356. 168 people died. More than 400 were injured, including 19 children. See, e.g., Sam Howe
Verhovek, Tight Security Gets Tighter As a Sad Anniversary Nears, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1996, at
Al.
provided a virtual blueprint of the Oklahoma bombing.' The fictional
work tells of a truck bomb loaded with ammonium nitrate fertilizer
that destroys the FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. when
detonated at 9:15 a.m., the time of the Oklahoma City bombing.35 The
book describes the blast: "Overturned trucks and automobiles,
smashed office furniture and building rubble were strewn wildly about
and so were the bodies of a shockingly large number of victims. Over
everything hung the pall of black smoke, burning our eyes and lungs
and reducing the bright morning to semi-darkness."'  But should one
jump from the conclusion that a book such as The Turner Diaries may
prove a blueprint for mayhem to the conclusion that the book should
be banned? Columnist Molly Ivins made this observation: "Normally
when you meet someone obsessed with a book, it's the Bible. David
Koresh, for example."'  She opined, "I hold Timothy McVeigh's
English teachers responsible for this whole situation. Didn't anyone
ever tell the poor boy the difference between a good book and a bad
one?,,"6
A main-line publisher, Lyle Stuart of Barricade Books, has
decided to print and distribute the book.2 Barricade Books has
published other controversial books, such as the Anarchist's
Cookbook.36Y Stuart, who is Jewish, says he will publish The Turner
357. Michael L. Landis & Jane E. Larson, The Blueprint for the Oklahoma City Bombing,
CONN. LAW TRIB., Aug. 28, 1995, at 31; John Kifner, Two Books Suggest Bomb Suspects Tried to
Copy Crimes Within, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 21, 1995, at A2; Bill Maxwell, Wounded Souls Follow
Others' Words, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 21, 1996, at 66A; Geordie Greig, Blueprint for a
Bloodbath, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Apr. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
TXTNWN file. A search by federal agents of the home of Terry Nichols, who is implicated in the
Oklahoma City bombing, produced a book from a library, Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the
Survivalist Right. Judy Thomas, Tracing Terry Nichols: Bombing Investigation Follows Gun
Shows and Inquiries about Trailers, KANSAS Crrv STAR, Aug. 13, 1995, at Al.
358. Joan Lowy, Militias Luring the Good, Bad and the Crazed: Paramilitary Style Right
Wing Groups Boast 150,000 Members in 40 States, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 22, 1995, at
36A.
359. Quoted by Dave Saltonstall, Probers Eye Bomber Book, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Apr.
30, 1995, at 7.
360. Molly Ivins, Tim McVeigh Demonstrates the Results of Obsession with a Bad Book, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 31, 1995, at 17A.
361. Id. Clearly, many bad books are available. For instance, The Anarchist's Cookbook
($24.95), Death by Deception: Advanced Improvised Booby Traps ($14), and Disruptive
Terrorism ($14.95) are available by mail. Richard Roeper, Apr. 19 A Day That Will Live in
Infamy, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 26,1995, at 11
362. Myrna Shinbaum, ADL Releases Background Information on "The Turner Diaries,"
U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS file.
363. Tom Searls, "Turner Diaries" Author Feels No Guilt, CHARLESTON GAZ., May 17, 1996,
at PlC; Publisher Expected Criticism over 'Turner Diaries' Release, CHARLESTON GAZ, Apr. 29,
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Diaries to warn the public of the danger. On 60 Minutes, Stuart said,
"Most Americans don't realize that these people want to kill all the
public officials and they want to do it now." The book, which Stuart
calls "pretty disgusting," will sell for $12.00 in paperback.365
B. The Internet and the Communications Decency Act
Some private organizations have asked booksellers not to stock
The Turner Diaries.3 But even if these organizations reduced the
number of books such as The Turner Diaries that are available in the
United States, alternative sources of information exist. For instance,
the Internet is a major source of information for leftwingers,
rightwingers, and everyone else in between who likes to surf.6 7 The
Internet offers an immediate access to information which books,
delayed by production and distribution, cannot offer. Within hours of
the Oklahoma City bombing, a diagram on how to construct a similar
bomb was posted on the Internet Trying to curb "how-to" or other
1996, at 7A; Linton Weeks Publisher to Market Racist 'Turner Diaries,' WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
1996, at Cl.
364. Searls, supra note 363. See also Liz Smith, The Gun Nut Book, NEWSDAY, July 10, 1996
at All; Elizabeth Ash Velez, Book of Hate: His Novel Linked to the Accused Oklahoma City
Bomber, William Pierce Republishes His 'Turner Diaries,' PEOPLE, June 10, 1996, at 153; Liz
Smith, Cookbook of Hate, NEWSDAY, Apr. 8, 1996, at A15.
365. Laurence Chollet, The Bible of the Right-Wing Militia; and Why a Publisher Found it Fit
to Print, RECORD, July 28, 1996, at El.
366. Id.; Velez, supra note 364; Norman Oder & Sean Hill, Should Bookstores Sell Hate
Books?, 243 PUBLISHERS WEEKLY 18 (1996); Doreen Carvajal, Group Tries to Halt Selling of
Racist Novel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1996, at 8 (identifying the group as the Southern Poverty Law
Center). Morris Dees, co-founder of the Southern Poverty Law Center, sent letters to the
American Booksellers Association and three bookstore chains, pointing out the book's parallels
to the Oklahoma City bombing. Weeks, supra note 363. See also Maxwell, supra note 357.
Of course, private groups that want to label some books as bad and urge their boycott are
not engaging in censorship, which is a government function. Their activities can limit the
availability of designated reading material, however, which is precisely the purpose of their
endeavors.
367. For instance, a neo-Nazi group, the National Alliance, maintains a World Wide Web
site. (It also publishes a comic book, the New World Order Comix.) Shinbaum, supra note 362.
On use of the Internet by the right wing, see Erik Davis, Barbed Wire Net: The Rightwing
Hunkers Down Online, VILLAGE VOICE, May 2, 1995, at 28. He comments, "Federal control
freaks and political scapegoaters will call for restrictions on inherently demonic data like bomb
recipes. This will call up the inevitable libertarians, tanked on the pure oxygen of First
Amendment enthusiasm and arguing to the effect that 'Information doesn't kill people, people
kill people."' Id.
368. Dennis Romero, Terror in Oklahoma City: Explosive Recipes Fill Books, Cyberspace,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at 26A. The Oklahoma blast, however, is deterring some "netizens,"
such as "Sirius," who said that he was thinking about publishing directions on how to build a
"small nuclear bomb" in his "forthcoming Balantine cyberpunk novel." He said, "But after I saw
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potentially dangerous information on the Internet would seem a
monumental, if not impossible, task. Government attempts to
control indecency on the Internet have failed so far. The
Communications Decency Act of 1996m hit a judicial barrier in its
confrontation with First Amendment advocates. In American Civil
Liberties Union v. Reno,371 a three-judge panel granted a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the CDA's indecency provisions,
finding its provisions unconstitutionally vague.' Judge Stewart
Dalzell commented:
The CDA will, without doubt, undermine the substantive,
speech-enhancing benefits that have flowed from the Internet.
Some of the dialogue on the Internet surely tests the limits of
conventional discourse. Speech on the Internet can be unfiltered,
unpolished, and unconventional, even emotionally charged, sexually
what happened in Oklahoma City, I thought, 'My God, what if someone actually used this
information." Id.
Information on how to build a nuclear bomb has been available for some time. United
States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979)(notorious hydrogen bomb case).
369. Attorney Donald P. Russo disagrees, putting his faith in technology: "Surely, those
bright lights who created this marvelous new technology can now apply their skills to devising a
way to 'police' it against those who wish to harm our children." Donald P. Russo, Electronic
Fingerprints Would Help Police Internet of Sociopaths, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Aug. 30,
1996, at A19. See also Transcripts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Terrorism, Technology, and Government, Information on Mayhem Manuals and the Internet,
May 11, 1995.
370. Communications Decency Act of 1996, in Title V, Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-43 (1996)(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h)).
371. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554
(1996).
372. As the court explained:
Plaintiffs focus their challenge on two provisions ....
Section 223(a)(1)(B) provides in part that any person in interstate or foreign
communications who, "by means of a telecommunications device,"
"knowingly ...makes, creates, or solicits" and "initiates the transmission" of "any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other communication which is
obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years
of age," "shall be criminally fined or imprisoned."
Section 223(d)(1) ("the patently offensive provision"), makes it a crime to use an
"interactive computer service" to "send" or "display in a manner available" to a person
under age 18, "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication."
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 828-29 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
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explicit, and vulgar in a word, "indecent" in many communities. But
we should expect such speech to occur in a medium in which citizens
from all walks of life have a voice. We should also protect the
autonomy that such a medium confers to ordinary people as well as
media magnates.?
The attitude expressed by Judge Dalzell concerning restrictions of
"indecent" material on the Internet could also apply to attempted
restrictions of "dangerous" or "harmful" information. If a provision
banning harmful information, such as bomb recipes from the Internet,
were crafted so as to pass constitutional muster, the problem of short-
wave radio transmissions by William Pierce and others would
remain.34 Trying to stop this form of communication would be nearly
impossible.
With so much information on bomb-making available, putting the
genie back in the bottle would seem difficult, but each incident of
terrorist bombing increases the desire to at least cap the bottle. The
flurry of hearings on Capitol Hill in the wake of the bombing in
Oklahoma City demonstrates the legislative concern about violent
threats to the status quo.35 The legislative angst arguably mirrors the
concern nationwide. On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed an
373. Id. at 877-81.
374. Morris Dees, Militias Still 'A Recipe for Disaster,'USA WEEKEND, Apr. 14, 1996, at 4.
375. See, e.g., Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America, Hearing
Before The Subcomm. on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). After calling the hearing to order, Rep. McCollum, a Florida
Republican, was careful to explain:
First, I want to clearly state what this hearing is not about. Today's hearing is not
about ideologies, political doctrines or mind-sets that are odd or troubling, or even
detestable. Governments can't and should not try to restrict thoughts or expressions of
its citizens. This hearing is also not about undesirable speech, such as hate-filled
rhetoric or bigotry. The First Amendment to the Constitution is the final word on that
subject. It's not about free association of people, no matter how much we may dislike
the interests that draw them together. Moreover, this hearing is not about guns. Gun
ownership is guaranteed by the Constitution . ...
You might ask then, What is this hearing about? The answer is simple: This
hearing is about violent behavior that threatens civil order.
See also Senate Select Intelligence Comm. Joint Hearing on Terrorism with the Senate Judiciary
Comm., Aug. 1, 1996; Summary Statement of Ralph C. Ostorski, Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, and Hazardous Materials, May 22, 1995. Ostorski, who is Chief of the Arson and
Explosives Division, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, discussed "the use of fertilizers
and other chemicals in explosive mixtures and . . . the capability ATF has in addressing the
issue."
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anti-terrorism law,376 vowing that "America will never tolerate
terrorism."3
C. Media and the Language of War
A tragedy of large proportions, such as the Oklahoma City
disaster, or bombings of the World Trade Center, or Atlanta's
Centennial Olympic Park, is not the only way to heighten public
awareness of danger. A steady stream of smaller stories about
bombings can have a cumulative effect. Although an increase in the
number of stories on a subject may mean only that the media has been
focusing more on the subject, bombings incidents have increased,
according to Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms statistics.
The statistics provide objective credence for subjective feelings of
heightened danger.
Dreadful, graphic illustrations carried by the news media show
what can happen when information, neutral in and of itself, gets into
the wrong hands, such as those of teenagers burned by their bomb-
building experiments. At least one has died from burns sustained
while trying to make a homemade bomb-guided by the directions in
the Anarchist's Cookbook, available on the Internet. 9 Instances of
young people using instructions from the Internet to make bombs and
then hurting themselves, or terrorizing others, or threatening to blow
up schools, come from every region of the country.3 The information,
376. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 104 Pub. L. No. 132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996).
377. John F. Harris, Clinton Signs 'Mighty Blow' Against Terrorism: Softened Measure
Becomes Law, ACL U Still Objects to Death Penalty Appeal Limits, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1996, at
A04. Oklahoma bombing survivors and families of victims watched President Clinton sign the
bill. See, e.g., Bomb Survivors Watch Clinton Sign Anti-Terrorism Bill, COMMERCIAL APPEAL
(Memphis), Apr. 25, 1996, at 4A.
378. For statistics, see, for example, Bruce Frankel, New Teen Fad: Building Bombs, USA
TODAY, May 6, 1996, at 2A; Andrea Stone, A Pestilence for the 21st Century: The Bomb, USA
TODAY, May 15, 1995, at 6A; John Meyer & Paul Feldman, Move to Curb Explosives Taking on a
New Urgency, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1995, at Al.
For a history of bombings, see Nina J. Easton, America the Enemy: Their Politics Are Light
Years Apart, But the Bombers of the '60s and '90s Share Volatile Rhetoric, Tangled Paranoion and
a Belief that Violence Is a Legitimate Weapon, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1995, at 8.
379. Donald P. Russo, supra note 369; Ron Devil, Recipe for Tragedy from the Internet,
MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Aug. 25, 1996, at B1.
380. Gaylord Shaw, Recipe for Terror/Teen Bombers Find What They Need on Internet,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 18,1996, at A7 (covering examples from California, Florida, Kansas, New York,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Texas). For other instances of youths
building bombs using The Anarchist's Cookbook obtained from the Internet, see Simon Pristel,
Youths Burned When Homemade Napalm Ignites, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 8, 1996, at 5 (two
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like the Internet, is available nationwide. Other selections available on
the Internet include: The Terrorist's Handbook, Improvised Land
Mines, Expedient Hand Grenades, Homemade Grenade Launchers,
and Homebuilt Flamethrowers.m
Awareness of danger, however, does not necessarily mean that
individuals will voluntarily take safety measures. For instance, while
fear mounted in Denver because of firebombers, a local newsstand
chain increased its offerings of "how-to" books on bomb building.M
Whatever the nomenclature-the slippery slope, the never-ending
spiral, the Apocalypse, Doomsday-the feeling of a descent to disaster
creates a cloying pessimism that elicits the vocabulary of war. In
custody, McVeigh told FBI agents who questioned him, "I am a
prisoner of war." The war mentality colors other areas of right-wing
parlance, as well. In the wake of the fire at the Branch Davidian
compound in Waco, Texas, some right-wingers call the Federal
children, aged 14 and 11, suffered serious bums); Pete Slover, Teen Hurt by Bomb Got Plans
Through Computer, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 26, 1996, at 25A (15-year-old boy lost three
fingers); Internet Aids in Kids' Bombs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 14, 1996, at A3; Geoff
Boucher, 4 Teens Admit to Bombs in Mission Viejo Schoolyard, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1996, at BI
(four teenaged boys crafted bombs; one exploded on a school's playground, injuring five-year-
old); For the Record: Bombs on Internet, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 10, 1996, at B2 (three teenagers
set off bomb outside a church). See also Steve Marlowe, Teen Bomb Makers Frustrate Cops; No
Way to Keep Lid on Recipes, RECORD, May 28, 1995, at A3 (covering situations where computer-
accessed information played a role, including cases such as two teenagers arrested for allegedly
plotting to bomb a high school and two twelve-year-olds who placed napalm-brew in their school
lockers); Christopher John Farley, America's Bomb Culture, TIME, May 8, 1995, at 56 (after New
Jersey teenagers tried to extort $1.3 million from high school using faxed bomb threats, police
found a copy of Jolly Roger's Cookbook downloaded from the Internet at one suspect's home).
For incidents involving pipe bombs, see Frankel, supra note 378. For non-Internet-related
instances of young people with bombs, see Home Bomb Blows Up in Teens' Faces, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 26, 1996, at B2; Nordeka English, Officials: Boy with Bomb Parts Targeted School,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 25, 1996, at 4B.
Not only young people use The Anarchist's Cookbook to threaten mayhem. See Bill
Swindell, Federal Conspiracy Trial Set to Begin, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 31, 1996, at A17 (three
persons charged in Oklahoma with threatening to blow up gay bars, abortion clinics, and an Anti-
Defamation League Building); Tom Foreman, Jr., Accused Bomber Leaves Trail: Affidavit
Outlines Raleigh Investigation of Mail Bomb Suspect, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), July 18,
1995, at Al (mail bomb injured wife; husband arrested).
381. Gaylord Shaw, supra note 380. A Newsday researcher found those titles in one hour on
the Internet. Id. Also available on the Internet is The Collection, a ghastly collection of stories
about results of amateurs making explosives, made available by Frank Heasley, who ripped his
legs open with explosives in the late 1950's. Lou Dolinar, Computers in the '90s: Danger Lurking
on the Internet, NEWSDAY, May 9, 1995, at B27.
382. Ann Carnahan, Stores Increase Stock of Books on Killing, Bombs: Newsland Chain
Loads Up on Titles About Explosives," RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 22, 1996, at 4A ("It's not
that we're just selling this to make money . . . . It's our solid belief that we can't censor.")
383. Evan Thomas, et al., The Plot, NEWSWEEK, May 8,1995, at 28.
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Bureau of Investigation the "Federal Bureau of Incineration. '" Some
also say that the letters "BATF" ("Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms") stand for "Burn All Toddlers First."' '
When the language is that of war, when the persistent, popular
feeling is that the country is indeed at war, then, arguably, liberties
become a luxury that a country can do without, as stability becomes
the staple from which the populace draws its sustenance. Will the
luxury of the First Amendment wither in order to maintain life
uninterrupted by bomb blasts? First Amendment impairment during
times of turmoil would not be new. In the first major First
Amendment case heard by the United States Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated his famous "clear and
present danger" test: 3
[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done .... The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. . . . The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question
of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight .... W
While the Court eventually moved to the incitement standard of
Brandenburg," the hard fact remains that not only freedom of speech
and press but also freedoms of association and privacy become
threatened when peace and safety have themselves become
threatened. 9 One concern for persons wanting to protect privacy is
384. Easton, supra note 378.
385. Dennis Wagner, What Drives Viper Case, Politics or Real Threat? U.S. Finding Smoking
Guns, But No Plot, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 12,1996, at AL; Thomas et al., supra note 383; Brigid
Schulte, Right-Wing Militia Groups Fear Atrocities by Federal Agents: A TF Called Bunch of
'Gun-Grabbing Goons," PHOENIX GAZ., Apr. 28, 1995, at A14.
386. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50 (1919).
387. Id. at 52 (citations omitted). In a later case, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951),
the Court turned to Justice Learned Hand for a definition of "clear and present danger": "In
each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 510 (citation
omitted).
388. For incitement theory and cases, see supra Part V.
389. For instance, President Clinton has vowed to expand government's power to wiretap
phones in an effort to combat terrorism. See, e.g., David Jackson, Clinton, Lawmakers Vow Unity
Against Terrorism: Congress to Reconsider Broader Wiretap Power, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July
30, 1996, at 1A. For federal wiretap law, see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 (West Supp. 1994).
[VOL. 19:225
BLOOD MONEY
that the greater the danger of terrorism, the less value society might
place on phone and e-mail privacy.' The "chilling" effect would be
Opinions differ on how much of a threat to privacy these so-called "roving" wiretaps would pose.
Under a roving wiretap, a law-enforcement agent could listen to phone conversations made on
any phone used by a suspect instead of only listening in on the suspect's home or business
phones. Agents would still have to apply for a wiretap order from a judge or invoke the
emergency-circumstances provision that is currently a part of federal wiretap law. Wiretapping
Authority, N.J. LAW J., Aug. 12, 1996, at 26.
Is the additional wiretap power proposed by Clinton de minimis? See id. (favoring the
increased wire-tap power):
[W]e believe in this instance that the danger to our privacy is so minimal that the
request for an adjustment to wiretap authority is justified. Since the technology exists
to enable this type of surveillance, we see no sound reason why it should not be
authorized legally, so long as the customary and established protections are adhered to
strictly.
Or does additional wiretap power pose a real threat to privacy? See Kimberly Crockett,
Securit: Safety Not Worth Sacrifice of Liberty," PHOENIX GAZ., Aug. 1, 1996, at B9. David Jackson
quotes opinions on both sides of the privacy issue concerning expanding the government's
wiretap power. Jackson, supra. As one commentator posed the issue:
The debate ...in Congress over how to craft a law-enforcement response to
terrorist attacks shows the American political system doing what it does best: forging
imperfect compromise, this time between public safety and personal liberty, between
the right to drop our children off at the downtown day care, assuming they will be safe,
and the right to join in political dissent without worrying that the phone is tapped.
Easton, supra note 378.
390. Law-enforcement authorities already have the power to use search warrants to hack
into private computer files. Reportedly, Detective Tom Goodrow of the Hartford, Connecticut
bomb squad was the first to use a warrant to search files of the operator of a computer bulletin
board offering bomb recipes. He would like even more aid for law-enforcement
authorities. See Marlowe, supra note 380.
One proposed aid for law-enforcement authorities, supported by President Clinton, is the
"clipper chip" or "dual key escrow." This technology would enable the government to
unscramble messages that had been encrypted using mathematical functions. The government
would hold copies of the deciphering key, the mathematical combination for unlocking encrypted
messages. See, e.g., Jack R. Paton, Government Frets Over 'Secret' Code Availability, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at 2A; John Markoff, Clinton Proposes Initiatives on the
Scrambling of Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1996, at 34; Erik Ness, Big Brother at Cyberspace: Will
Your Freedom and Privacy Be Roadkill on the Information Superhighway?, PROGRESSIVE, Dec.
1994, at 22.
The concern of the government is that many violent, unscrupulous persons such as terrorists
communicate via encrypted messages using encryption technology that is readily available. A
devotee of "freeware" (also known as "shareware"), Philip Zimmerman, made available world-
wide an encryption program known as "Pretty Good Privacy." See Ness, supra.
PGP is available for free down-loading from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's
web site. See Dave Farrel, Encryptingfor Privacy, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Sept. 1, 1996,
at 1E. Encryption, Zimmerman explains, is like an "envelope" for an e-mail message. Just as an
envelope protects the privacy of persons sending a letter through the United States postal system,
encryption protects e-mail. See John Yemma, When Your Private E-Mail Goes Public, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sep 2, 1996, at C1. On the envelope analogy, see also John M. Moran, Government
Reboots its Effort to Gain Access to Electronic Mail, HARTFORD COURANT, July 18, 1996, at E2.
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felt on speech intended for private communication, as well as that
intended for mass communication.
VII
Conclusion
Commenting on Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine% and the
pending suit against Tupac Shakur's estate,2 Bruce Fein says:
The negligence theories behind the suits against [Soldier of
Fortune] and Time Warner should be applauded, not deplored, by
genuine friends of the mass media. They simply seek to hold
publishers to a reasonable standard of care that is customary in the
industry and that society has a reasonable right to expect.
Negligence, moreover, is a far less demanding standard than the
strict liability that most industries confront. Additionally, only a
fevered imagination could perceive any public enlightenment in the
words under challenge in the [Soldier of Fortune] and Time Warner
cases.
A rogue elephant press strutting on legal pedestals is destined to
self-destruction. A far-sighted mass media would . . . rejoice at a
few salutary lawsuits to drive out irresponsible practices that subvert
public trust and respect.
9
Laying aside the question of whether "rogue elephants" can strut,
the important issue is whether the media should "rejoice at a few
salutary lawsuits." Is it healthy to rejoice when the law comes crashing
down on a few, especially if it leaves many others in a quandary? A
comment on the Braun case poses this question: "What if a person
contracts AIDS from responding to a 'dating' ad? What will be the
limits on this claim for negligent publication of an ad?" 39 His answer
One message which Zimmerman received, and which demonstrates why he is so opposed to
giving government the key to unscramble and read encrypted messages, came from Latvia: "Phil
I wish you to know: Let it never be, but if dictatorship takes over Russia your PGP is widespread
from Baltic to Far East now and win [sic] help democratic people if necessary. Thanks." Id. In
front of a House Subcommittee in 1993, he worried aloud about privacy because, as he said,
"very bad people" may be elected in a democracy. "'Normally, a well-functioning democracy has
ways to remove these people from power,' Zimmerman continued, 'but the wrong technology
infrastructure could allow such a future government to watch every move anyone makes to
oppose it. It could very well be the last government we ever elect."' See Ness, supra
391. See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 321-355 and accompanying text.
393. Bruce Fein, Shaking the First's Foundations?: Healthy Lawsuits, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1992, at F1 (emphasis added).
394. Slade Metcalf, Ad Liability: How Real is the Threat?, 18 FOLIO 195, available in 1989 WL
2586665.
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is not one designed to make journalists rejoice: "Time may tell."' In
the meantime, what are journalists and others engaged in mass
communication supposed to do? In trying to keep a distance from a
nebulous zone of potential liability, they may well engage in self-
censorship. Of course, self-censorship has its positive aspect insofar as
it promotes "responsibility"-what the Supreme Court calls the
"undoubtedly desirable goal" of being responsible, a virtue which
"cannot be legislated."' 396 But the thought of rules self-imposed in
order to avoid nebulous zones of liability can strike terror in First
Amendment-loving hearts because the chill of self-censorship can
dampen expression and creativity.
Yet, so many gag reflexes have been activated by what many
people perceive as mass media irresponsibility that people are
welcoming, even praising lawsuits. The Hit Man suit is the prime
example.3' A former attorney general of West Virginia, Charles G.
Brown, who wrote First Get Mad, then Get Justice: The Handbook for
Crime Victims, said:
The "Hit Man" manual is clinical. It painstakingly explains how to
obtain contracts for money, how to commit murder, how to leave no
incriminating evidence behind, and how to find the next client to get
paid for the next murder. The manual is remorseless. . . . The
author advises the contract killer which weapons are most effective,
where to shoot the victim, and even how to avoid getting blood
squirted onto himself.
If the natural and logical consequences of its willful actions
helped lead to these murders-for-hire, the publisher should not be
allowed to hide behind the 1st Amendment....
• . . [T]his case is not about free speech at all. It is about
responsible behavior, something for which we are all accountable,
including book sellers.
3%
Nor does Bruce Fein, who speaks against the "rogue elephant
press,"' see any need for protection of Hit Man's publisher. He says,
"Drawing sensible lines is the hallmark of enlightened law. The First
Amendment is no exception. Experience discredits the idea that to
395. Id.
396. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,256 (1974).
397. For supportive comments on the Hit Man suit from Rod Smolla, Stuart Taylor, and
Bruce Fein, see supra note 54 and accompanying text and note 55.
398. Brown, supra note 25.
399. See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
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ban 'Hit Man . . . ' is but a step away from banning the Lincoln-
Douglas debates."'
The question is where to draw the "sensible" line that Fein thinks
exists. Clearly Hit Man is a long distance from the Lincoln-Douglas
debates, but consider Stephen King's book Rage. The book describes
a fictional teenager who uses a gun to hold his algebra class hostage.
The teen kills a teacher and an instructor, and contemplates killing a
popular male student. On February 2, 1996, Barry Loukaitis went to
his junior high school in Washington state, where he murdered his
algebra teacher and two male students. Police reportedly found a copy
of Rage on Loukaitis's nightstand. 1
When Mark David Chapman murdered John Lennon, he clutched
a copy of The Catcher in the Rye, by J.D. Salinger. Martin Scorsese's
film Taxi Driver aroused John Hinkley, who shot then-President
Ronald Reagan in an attempt to impress actress Jodie Foster.'
Should King, Salinger, or Scorsese be liable for negligence? How
about Shakespeare? James Gill asks what crimes the two young
people who saw Oliver Stone's movie Natural Born Killers might have
committed if they had been exposed to repeated showings of
Shakespeare's Richard III. "At least Stone hasn't so far suggested
killing all the lawyers," Gill quips.' ° What about movies that feature
bombings, such as Top Dog, Die Hard with a Vengeance, Speed, and
Blown Away?
Even for obscenity, the United States Supreme Court has an
escape clause of sorts, known as the "SLAPS" test. The Court asks
400. Bruce Fein, Crime, Responsibility, and Free Speech, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at A17.
401. Parallels in King Novel, School Shooting Noted, COMM. APPEAL (Memphis), Apr. 11,
1996, at 5A. For Stephen King's views on a writer's moral responsibility, see Stephen King, The
Last Waltz-Horror and Morality, Horror and Magic, in DANCE MACABRE (Chapter X) (New
York 3d ed. 1983).
402. Freedland, supra note 39.
403. Jeff Simon, Dark Vision; the Case for Scorsese's 'Taxi Driver,' BUFFALO NEWS, July 5,
1996, at 20G. See also, Freedland, supra note 39. Stanley Kubrick, director of the movie A
Clockwork Orange, voluntarily banned his own movie from further distribution in Great Britain
after two youths imitated actor Malcolm McDowell's rape of a woman to the tune of Singin' in
the Rain. See Shnayerson, supra note 39 and accompanying text.
404. James Gill, Movie Effects, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 7, 1996, at B7.
405. See Farley, supra note 380. A March 1, 1997 shoot-out in North Hollywood by two
bank robbers wearing black body armor and firing automatic weapons was reminiscent of the
movie Heat. After nearly an hour of raging battle, ten police officers and five bystanders lay
wounded, and the robbers lay dead. See Shawn Hubler, The North Hollywood Shootout; Pulp
Reality in L.A., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1997, at Al; B. Drummand Ayres, Jr., Police Kill 2 Bank
Robbery Suspects in a Wild Gun Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1997, at A7.
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"whether the work, taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value."'  If the work does, then it passes
constitutional muster and cannot be censored. In the Court's words,
"[I]n the area of freedom of speech and press the courts must always
remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific expression." Of course, the Court in
obscenity cases is addressing the question of whether a work can be
banned outright, not whether the work's creators can be held
accountable if their work causes harm.
John Grisham wants accountability through legal liability. He
draws an implicit analogy by speaking of the Second Amendment to
make his point about the First Amendment. Stating that "no right is
absolute," Grisham notes that the Second Amendment right to keep a
loaded gun does not absolve the owner of negligence if a child picks
the gun up from a coffee table and shoots himself. Oliver Stone
replies, "one may presume that, according to Mr. Grisham's logic, the
next time a 'righteous' revenge murder takes place (or, for that matter,
the rape of a child) he will be happy to assume liability if it can be
shown that the offender had read or seen [Grisham's] A Time to
Kill."M
Grisham says, "It will take only one large verdict against the likes
of Oliver Stone, and his production company, and perhaps the
screenwriter, and the studio itself, and then the party will be over.
'41°
The problem is, however, that if the party is over for Stone and his
"likes," the party may well be over for Grisham, too. As Vincent Blasi
says, "[T]his ideal of legal liability could come back to haunt authors
like John Grisham. Censorship, like revolution, often devours its own
children."4"
Stone says that Grisham is "on the age-old hunt for witches to
explain society's ills . . . ignoring Shakespeare, who reminds us that
artists do not invent nature but merely hold it up to a mirror." '412 He
also quips, "Has your lawyer-husband been unfaithful? Slap a
summons on John Grisham, since, after all, he wrote 'The Firm."'
41 3
406. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added).
407. Id. at 22-23.
408. Shnayerson, supra note 39, at 144.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Gleick, supra note 40.
412. Shnayerson, supra note 39, at 143.
413. Id. at 143-44.
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But Grisham replies that "when causation is clearly proven, then the
'artist' should be required to share the responsibility along with the
nut who actually pulled the trigger.,
414
The problem with Grisham's view is that he would hold the
creator of a work responsible for what a "nut" does in reaction. He is
calling for strict liability for the actions of a person whose mind is
diseased or in some other way defective (possibly affected by LSD or
some other drug). He is not even trying to limit the accountability to
the typical negligence standard, the harm a "reasonably prudent"
artist could reasonably foresee.415 Given Grisham's view, what creative
person could ever be safe? Could Dr. Seuss have written How the
Grinch Stole Christmas without fear of liability? After all, some "nut"
(to use Grisham's term) could be inspired to break into homes and
steal Christmas presents. If "causation is clearly proven," should Dr.
Seuss or his estate be required to pay to help replace missing
Christmas gifts?
The fact is that we live in a dangerous world. How safe do we
want to make it? Nature herself offers many dangers. Do we restrict
access to a bluff because some people might be inspired to jump or
push someone else off? Do we restrict access to lakes and rivers
because some people might be inspired to drown themselves or to
hold other people under? If we excuse Mother Nature, then we can
ask the same for tall buildings or swimming pools. But negligence law
concerning real property has developed to make arguably reasonable
distinctions. "Attractive nuisances" can be harmful, whether natural or
man-made, and appropriate safeguards can be required in order for
414. Id. The larger context of Grisham's quote is:
The issue is not whether Oliver Stone's movies are protected by the First Amendment.
They are. He can make anything he wants, regardless of how nauseating.
Pornographers share the same protection, because, hey, they're artists! But the issue is
responsibility: should Stone and his ilk be held responsible if, and only if, a direct causal
link can be proven between a movie (or a book or a song) and the violence inspired by
it? I'll admit this is a very difficult standard to meet, but when causation is clearly
proven, then the "artist" should be held liable. And the "artist" should be required to
share the responsibility along with the nut who actually pulled the trigger.
Id.
415. For coverage of the "reasonably prudent" person standard, see supra notes 12-13 and
accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has rejected the "nut" standard, more genteelly labeled as a
"particularly susceptible person" standard, in obscenity cases. It struck down the Hicklin test,
saying, "The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the
effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons." Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476,489-499 (1957) (rejecting Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868)).
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owners to escape liability. Now negligence law is trying to make
reasonable distinctions where First Amendment activities are
concerned. Granted, the task is difficult.
In trying to draw the line between acceptable and unreasonably
dangerous communications, one runs onto some hallowed ground.
Negligence law should not be used to "chill" news, even though news
accounts can inspire "copy cat" crimes. Surely Grisham would not
propose that the nightly newscasters be held liable if "causation is
clearly proven" between a newscast and a "nut" who decides to
replicate the crime so he or she can also be in the news?
At the other end of the spectrum, however, are the "how to"
books, which seemingly intend for persons to follow their directions
and cause mayhem. In the defendant's summary judgment motion in
the Hit Man case, the defendant's concession was damning:
"[D]efendants intended and had knowledge that their publications
would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and would-be criminals to
plan and execute the crime of murder for hire, in the manner set forth
in the publications. 41 6 Trying to defend this kind of activity might
seem little more difficult than defending the execution of the crimes
themselves. Nevertheless, the defendant publisher won its summary
judgment motion.417
The step appears small between holding Soldier of Fortune
accountable and holding Paladin Press accountable in the Hit Man
case. The magazine provided an ad for a contract assassin, and the
publisher provided the blueprint for a contract assassin. But what if
416. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 940 F. Supp. 836, 839 (S.D. Md. 1996). See also Stuart Taylor,
Jr., A Constitutional Suicide Pact? LEGAL TiMS, Aug. 5, 1996, at 23. Taylor comments, "I like my
freedom of speech as well as the next fellow, but I'm with Smolla on this one-at least on the
summary judgment issue." Id.
Bruce Fein also argues for liability in the Hit Man case:
An arch legal principle holds persons civilly liable for the criminal conduct of
others in a variety of circumstances. Landlords are responsible for failing to undertake
safety measures to protect tenants from crime that might reasonably be anticipated.
Gun dealers are similarly liable for sale to customers who they had reason to believe
would use the firearms in crime. Bar owners are open to liability for alcohol sales to
intoxicants who subsequently commit mayhem in violation of DWI prohibitions.
Further, owners whose property is used in crime expose themselves to forfeiture for
neglecting reasonable precautions against such anti-social use.
The theory behind these liability rules is sound and simple:
Citizens and businesses are obliged to act reasonably to avoid assisting or
facilitating crimes that might be reasonably anticipated. . . . As applied to Paladin
Press, the theory makes a persuasive case for liability.
Fein, supra note 55, at A17.
417. Rice, 940 F. Supp at 849.
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the same information as in Hit Man were provided in a novel or a
movie? Perhaps intent could provide a necessary distinction. If the
novelist or movie-maker had no intent for the book or movie to be
used as a blueprint, then they would be relieved of liability. Hit Man
had that intent. Oliver Stone denies any intent to cause the carnage
resulting from Natural Born Killers. Instead, Stone says his intent was
to create a satire about the way the American culture and its media
crave violence.418
"Intent," of course, is a primary ingredient for incitement cases.
The lack of intent should protect Stone for Natural Born Killers, and it
should protect the estate of Tupac Shakur and the record company for
gangsta rap. In short, for the mass media, an "incitement" theory does
not pose a great potential danger.419 But negligence is a different
matter. While incitement requires "intent," which is difficult to prove,
negligence merely requires "foreseeability"-determined, one might
say, with twenty-twenty hindsight.4' °
Under current negligence law as applied to media, reliance can be
an important element for liability. If one relies on an aeronautical
chart and then slams into a mountain, the survivors can collect from
the chart's publisher. If a guarantee is made by a printer, such as the
"Good Housekeeping" seal of approval, then the printer may well
have sealed his or her liability. When the vulnerability of a crime
victim increases because a newspaper releases the victim's name and
address while the assailant is still at large, the paper may pay. Such
liability is increasing, as shown by Soldier of Fortune with its liability
for an assassin's ad
Hit Man could still take a "hit," which would arguably be a logical
extension of the liability found in Soldier of Fortune Magazine. A loss
would send chills through "how to" publishers. If Tupac Shakur's
estate and record company are found liable for the shooting death of
the trooper, gangsta rap singers might consider heading for cover. If
Stone is found liable for Natural Born Killers, then open season will
418. See Shnayerson, supra note 39.
419. For incitement cases, see supra Part IV.
420. The trial judge in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc. was cognizant of this
problem, and he told the jury: "Now, of course, the tendency to read the advertisement in
question in hindsight is hard to avoid, but it must be avoided. The test for you is not how the
advertisement in question reads now in light of subsequent events, but rather how the
advertisement read to a reasonable publisher at the time of publication." 968 F.2d 1110, 1113
(11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071 (1993). For a discussion of Braun, see supra notes 81-
103 and accompanying text.
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exist for anyone looking either for an excuse to share liability or for a
deep pocket. Grandparents will perhaps have to watch the fairytales
they tell their grandchildren. After all, the witch gave Snow White a
poison apple. If little Johnny hears the tale and decides to give his
teacher an apple laced with something he discovered on.the Internet
or in a junior chemistry set . . . . At least the grandparents would
likely share liability with a deep pocket, Snow White's creator, Walt
Disney, Inc.
In the meantime, the bottom line is that journalists and others
engaged in mass communication encounter a foreseeable risk of
financial harm to themselves if they disregard the doctrine of
negligence as applied to the media. The language in Hyde states
clearly the test journalists must remember:
It is the likelihood of injury to another that gives rise to the duty to
exercise due care. The test of negligence liability is foreseeability:
that the actor knows or has reason to foresee that the act involves an
unreasonable risk of injury to another but fails to protect against
that hazard. 421
Where ink can draw blood, courts will draw a line-a "blood
line," one might say-and then permit plaintiffs to draw blood money.
421. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 271 (Mo. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1226 (1983). For discussion of Hyde, see supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text. This
doctrine would surely apply in newsgathering situations, such as in Waco, as well as applying to a
journalist's finished product. If anything, this doctrine should apply with even more force to
alleged newsgathering wrongs because newsgathering does not receive the same degree of First
Amendment protection as speech itself. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v.
Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
19971

